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PAY UP OR ELSE: IMMIGRATION BOND AND 
HOW A SMALL PROCEDURAL CHANGE 
COULD LIBERATE IMMIGRANT DETAINEES 
Abstract: On any given day, thousands of immigrants are detained while they 
await their day in court. While there are procedures in place that would allow 
them to be released on bond, many immigrants who are granted bond remain de-
tained due to their inability to pay. This is partially because immigration judges 
are not required to consider an immigrant’s financial situation when setting bond. 
A recent decision from the Ninth Circuit requires immigration judges to consider 
an immigrant’s financial situation when setting bond. This decision has both pol-
icy and legal merit and could result in the liberation of thousands of immigrants. 
INTRODUCTION 
Xochitl Hernandez, a non-legal Mexican immigrant and mother of five, 
was detained in Los Angeles while visiting a friend in February of 2016.1 Nev-
er charged with a crime, she was transferred from the custody of the Los Ange-
les Police Department to the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).2 Ap-
pearing before the immigration court pro se, Ms. Hernandez successfully con-
vinced an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that she should be released on bond.3 
Without considering Ms. Hernandez’s financial situation, the IJ set her bond at 
sixty-thousand dollars, which she was unable to afford.4 As a result, Ms. Her-
nandez remained detained in an immigration detention center for a substantial 
portion of her immigration proceedings.5 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Hernandez v. Sessions (Hernandez II), 872 F.3d 976, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2017) (challenging 
the government’s detention policies). Ms. Hernandez was the named plaintiff of this suit, which was a 
class action. See id. at 983–85. 
 2 Id. at 984. 
 3 See id. Immigration Judges (“IJs”) are administrative judges appointed by the Attorney General 
and are responsible for presiding over immigration proceedings. Immigration Judge, U.S. CUSTOMS & 
IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/immigration-judge [https://perma.cc/
VSC5-93JB]; see Pro Se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining pro se as representing 
oneself without a lawyer). 
 4 Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 984. 
 5 See id. Immigration detention centers vary, though some reports have outlined inhumane condi-
tions with immigrants reporting being denied access to healthcare, or safe food. See Elaine Murphy, 
What Really Happens Inside American Immigration Facilities and Detention Centers, TEEN VOGUE 
(Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/inside-american-immigration-facilities-and-
detention-centers [https://perma.cc/59RV-WB53] (detailing immigrant reports of subpar detention 
conditions); see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., CONCERNS ABOUT 
ICE DETAINEE TREATMENT AND CARE AT DETENTION FACILITIES (2017) (detailing health and safety 
issues at various immigration detention centers). 
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The federal government has long struggled with the question of what to 
do about immigrants who illegally enter the United States.6 This debate has 
often focused, at least for the general public and the media, on when an immi-
grant should be deported, and under what circumstances they should be al-
lowed to stay.7 Immigration activists and lawyers confront a lesser known, but 
equally important, struggle: reforming the procedures of an immigration court 
system that they view as draconian.8 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See generally Kari Hong, Opinion, My Great-Grandparents Weren’t ‘Illegal’ When They Came 
to the U.S. They Would Be Now, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/opinion-hong-immigrants-iirira_us_5a734e0ae4b01ce33eb0b97b [https://perma.cc/GW2M-
LE4H] (discussing the various influences that have impacted the development of immigration law). 
Throughout the statutes, regulations, and relevant case law, immigrants are often referred to as “al-
iens.” See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2018) (providing that “an alien may be arrested” (emphasis add-
ed); Matter of Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. 791, 791 (B.I.A. 2016) (stating “an alien who seeks a change in 
custody status . . .”) (emphasis added); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2018) (providing “an alien’s request for a 
subsequent bond proceeding . . .”) (emphasis added). This term has been deemed by many as offen-
sive. See Derek Hawkins, The Long Struggle Over What to Call ‘Undocumented Immigrants’ or, as 
Trump Said in His Order, ‘Illegal Aliens,’, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/02/09/when-trump-says-illegals-immigrant-advocates-recoil-he-
would-have-been-all-right-in-1970/?utm_term=.bf460ea6daf0 [https://perma.cc/E43Q-XFBY] (dis-
cussing the debate over the term “alien”); Jose Antonio Vargas, Opinion, I’m Not an ‘Alien’, L.A. 
TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0814-vargas-illegal-alien-
20150813-story.html [https://perma.cc/5JGD-VF96] (discussing offensive connotations connected 
with the term “alien”). As such, throughout this Note, when possible, individuals in immigration pro-
ceedings are referred to as “immigrants” instead of “aliens.” See infra notes 7–224 and accompanying 
text. 
 7 See generally Ross Douthat, Opinion, The Necessary Immigration Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/opinion/sunday/necessary-immigration-debate.html 
[https://perma.cc/2XZE-CR9V] (discussing the various issues at play in the debate on immigration 
policy). 
 8 See generally Kyle Kim, Immigrants Held in Remote ICE Facilities Struggle to Find Legal Aid 
Before They’re Deported, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-access-
to-counsel-deportation/ [https://perma.cc/M5U4-NY9S] (discussing difficulties for detained immi-
grants located far away from big cities and public interest lawyers and the draconian nature of immi-
gration detention facilities); Oliver Laughland, Inside Trump’s Secretive Immigration Court: Far from 
Scrutiny and Legal Aid, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/jun/07/donald-trump-immigration-court-deportation-lasalle [https://perma.cc/V8LJ-JQKQ] 
(discussing procedural, structural, and technical flaws involved with an immigrant detention center 
located in La Salle, Louisiana); Maria Sacchetti, In This Boston Court, Chains Are a Familiar Sound, 
BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/08/28/boston-immigration-
court-chains-are-familiar-sound/Gzczn3WdHMgPiDFnqKF01L/story.html [https://perma.cc/CW8K-
ZEUB] (discussing the practice of having immigrant detainees appear in court in chains). The practice 
of locating detention centers far away from big cities results in a shocking lack of representation in 
immigration proceedings. See Kim, supra (noting that in one survey, only 14% of detainees had se-
cured counsel). Even when detained immigrants are housed in detention centers in big cities, some 
procedures implemented can be far outside of the norm for civil or even criminal proceedings. Com-
pare Sacchetti, supra (discussing the practice of chaining the hands and feet of all detainees appearing 
before the Boston Immigration Court), with Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (finding that a judge 
may order a defendant bound on a case by case basis if necessary to maintain order in the courtroom). 
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In 2017, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) reported an 
average of thirty-eight thousand detainees under its control on any given day.9 
This number is expected to increase based on a change in policy under the 
Trump Administration.10 These detainees, like their counterparts in the crimi-
nal system, are afforded the right to a hearing and can be freed by a judge.11 
Immigrants can achieve release from detention through an award of bond, 
which functions in a substantially similar manner to criminal bail.12 The pro-
cedures in immigration bond hearings, however, differ from criminal bail hear-
ings in several important ways.13 One crucial difference is the approach taken 
under the two systems to determine the amount at which bail will be set, or if 
bail will be granted at all.14 In criminal proceedings, judges are required to 
consider the defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay when setting a 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Laurel Wamsley, As It Makes More Arrests, ICE Looks for More Detention Centers, NPR 
(Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/26/560257834/as-it-makes-more-
arrests-ice-looks-for-more-detention-centers [https://perma.cc/KVH4-7JRD] (discussing increased 
federal funding for ICE). U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is a government entity 
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that is responsible for the detention of immi-
grants, among other things. See Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUS-
TOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/ero [https://perma.cc/Z92W-DPQD] (stating the functions of the 
DHS). 
 10 See Wamsley, supra note 9 (detailing the increased federal budget for ICE); see SARAH PIERCE & 
ANDREW SELEE, MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION SHIFTS UNDER TRUMP: A REVIEW OF POLI-
CY SHIFTS IN THE YEAR SINCE THE ELECTION 2 (2016) (outlining the changes in immigration policy in 
the first year of the Trump Administration). Under the Trump administration, immigration arrests and 
deportations have drastically increased. See Michael Burke, ICE Arrests and Removals Continue to Surge 
Under Trump, THE HILL (Sept. 6, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/405405-ice-
arrests-of-noncriminal-immigrants-continue-to-surge [https://perma.cc/HPK4-X76Y] (detailing the 
increased number of immigrants detained by ICE). 
 11 See Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial 
Immigration Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157, 169–71 (2016) (detailing immigration bond hearing proce-
dures); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (McKinney 2012) (providing procedures for crimi-
nal bail hearings in New York). 
 12 See Gilman, supra note 11, at 169–71 (providing an explanation of immigration bond proce-
dure). Throughout this Note, I will refer to bail and bond; generally, bond refers to immigration pro-
ceedings and bail refers to criminal proceedings, though the meanings of the two terms are largely 
interchangeable. See Bail, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining bail as “a bond”) 
(emphasis added). 
 13 See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of 
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 472 (2007) (discussing the lack of procedural 
protections for detainees in immigration court that are present for defendants in criminal court). 
 14 Compare Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (discussing how courts should set bail amounts), 
and N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (listing factors to consider when setting criminal bail in New 
York), and WYO. RULES. CRIM. PROC. 46.1(d) (2018) (listing factors to consider when setting crimi-
nal bail in Wyoming), with Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 793 (establishing factors to consider when set-
ting immigration bond), and 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1 (providing procedure for setting initial immigration 
bond). 
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bail amount.15 This is not the case in immigration proceedings.16 IJs set bond 
amounts with no consideration of an immigrant’s finances.17 Thus, immigrants 
often remain in detention because they lack the necessary financial resources 
to make bond, even though they pose no threat to the community.18 
This Note examines the relationship between the bail system employed in 
criminal law and bond proceedings employed in immigration law, and argues 
in favor of the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that 
IJs should consider an immigrant’s financial situation when setting a bond 
amount.19 Part I examines the procedures and constitutional limits for both 
criminal bail and immigration bond.20 Part II discusses constitutional protec-
tions provided to non-legal immigrants and the ways in which criminal consti-
tutional protections could be extended to the immigration context.21 Finally, 
Part III argues that the decision reached by the Ninth Circuit was proper on 
                                                                                                                           
 15 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A) (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 276, § 58 (2016); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 
LAW § 510.30(2)(a)(ii); WYO. R. CRIM. PROC. 46.1(d)(3)(A); see Gilman, supra note 11, at 205 
(comparing standards for bail in the criminal and immigration systems). 
 16 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2018) (providing the statutory authority for immigration bond by the 
Attorney General); Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 793 (establishing factors to consider when setting im-
migration bond); In re Castillo-Cajura, No. A089 853 733, 2009 WL 3063742, at *1 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 
2009) (finding that financial situation of an immigrant is not a relevant factor in determining bond 
amount); In re Sandoval-Gomez, No. AXXX XX3 965, 2008 WL 5477710, at *1 (B.I.A. Dec. 15, 
2008) (finding that an immigrant’s financial situation is not a relevant factor in the consideration of 
bond amount); In re Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666, 666–67 (B.I.A. 1976) (finding that in determining 
immigration bond, an IJ should consider the flight risk posed by a particular immigrant and any dan-
ger they might pose to the national security); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h) (noting that the factors to be con-
sidered when setting bond but not including financial resources). The statute provides that initial bond 
determinations are made by the Attorney General. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (providing that initial bond 
determinations are made by the Attorney General). In reality, it is usually ICE officers who make this 
initial determination. See Gilman, supra note 11, at 165 (discussing the initial bond determination 
made by DHS agents). 
 17 See Castillo-Cajura, 2009 WL 3063742, at *1 (finding that the financial situation of an immi-
grant is not a relevant factor in determining bond amount); Sandoval-Gomez, 2008 WL 5477710, at *1 
(finding that an immigrant’s financial situation is not a relevant factor in the consideration of bond 
amount); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h) (providing procedure for setting immigration bond that does not in-
clude consideration of an individual’s financial situation). 
 18 See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 984 (noting that the IJ in lower proceeding found that plaintiff 
was not a threat, but that the plaintiff remained detained due to plaintiff’s lack of funds with which to 
pay bond); see also OLGA BYRNE ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, LIFELINE ON LOCKDOWN: IN-
CREASED U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 25–30 (2016) (describing experiences of immigrants 
who were granted monetary bond but remained detained due to their inability to pay); N.Y. UNIV. 
SCH. OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC ET AL., INSECURE COMMUNITIES, DEVASTATED FAMILIES: 
NEW DATA ON IMMIGRANT DETENTION AND DEPORTATION PRACTICES IN NEW YORK CITY 11 
(2012) [hereinafter INSECURE COMMUNITIES] (noting that in New York, 55% of immigrants who are 
granted monetary bond are unable to pay it and thus remain detained). If an immigrant is found to be a 
threat, they cannot be granted bond. Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 793. 
 19 See infra notes 1–224 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 23–84 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 85–183 and accompanying text. 
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both legal and policy grounds, and ought to be upheld and adopted as policy by 
the federal government.22 
I. BOND AND BAIL PROCEDURES: HOW THEY STAND 
It is an established legal premise in the United States that one who has not 
yet been convicted of a crime generally should not have his liberty restricted.23 
The purpose of bail in criminal cases is largely to ensure that the accused can 
maintain his liberty until such time that he is convicted, while also providing a 
monetary incentive for him to attend all required court appearances.24 Bail is 
not intended as a punishment, but rather as a method of keeping the criminally 
accused present in a particular jurisdiction.25 Although each state has its own 
specific criminal statutes and procedural rules, courts have generally held that 
bail should be granted unless a defendant poses a particularly high risk of 
flight or a significant danger to the safety of the community.26 
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits instituting ex-
cessive bail.27 The U. S. Supreme Court has held that a bail amount set higher 
than necessary to ensure a defendant’s presence at required court appearances 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 184–224 and accompanying text. 
 23 See Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 197 (1960) (stating “[t]he fundamental tradition in 
this country is that one charged with a crime is not, in ordinary circumstances, imprisoned until after a 
judgment of guilt”). 
 24 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (discussing the historical purpose of bail); Ex parte 
Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 710 (1835) (discussing the purpose of bail not as a punishment but 
rather a means of ensuring a defendant’s appearance). 
 25 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 5 (discussing the purpose of bail as being a protection against the flight 
of the defendant); Milburn, 34 U.S. at 710 (discussing the purpose of bail as a means for ensuring a 
defendant’s appearance). 
 26 See Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 669 (1962) (holding that rejection of bail was merit-
ed as the defendant posed a significant threat to his community); Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1347 
(Wyo. 1977) (establishing when bail should be granted). The Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure 
list various factors to take into consideration when determining a particular defendant’s flight risk. 
WYO. R. CRIM. PROC. 46.1(d); Vigil, 563 P.2d at 1347. Similar factors are widely considered in other 
jurisdictions as well and include: 
(1) [t]he nature and circumstances of the offense charged (2) [t]he weight of the evi-
dence against the person; (3)(A) [t]he person’s character, physical and mental condi-
tion, family ties, employment, financial resources, the length of his residence in the 
community, community ties, past conduct, history related to drug or alcohol abuse, 
criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings. 
WYO. R. CRIM. PROC. 46.1(d); see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a) (listing factors similar to 
those in the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure that a judge must consider when deciding whether 
to grant bail); see also Jones v. Grimes, 134 S.E.2d 790, 792 (Ga. 1964) (finding that a judge should 
consider several factors when deciding whether to grant bail, many of which are similar to those found 
in the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure). 
 27 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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violates the Constitution.28 As such, when determining an appropriate bail 
amount in criminal cases, judges are expected to consider a defendant’s ability 
to raise the required funds.29 
Similarly, immigration proceedings allow the accused to pay for release 
using the bond system.30 Pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”), after an initial warrant is issued, an immigrant can be arrested and 
held by DHS.31 Agents make an immediate determination as to whether they 
think the arrested immigrant should be released on bond.32 If they decide to 
hold the immigrant in detention without bond, the immigrant can request a 
bond redetermination hearing in immigration court.33 If redetermination is re-
quested, an IJ determines whether the immigrant should be released.34 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 759 (1987) (finding that if the government’s goal in 
pretrial detention of a defendant is ensuring his appearance, then bail should be set to an amount no 
greater than what is required for that purpose); Stack, 342 U.S. at 5 (noting that bail set higher than 
reasonably necessary to ensure a defendant’s appearance was unconstitutional). 
 29 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 759 (finding that if the government’s purpose in pre-trial detention is 
ensuring a defendant’s appearance, bail should be set no greater than required to accomplish that pur-
pose); Stack, 342 U.S. at 5 (noting that bail set higher than reasonably necessary to ensure a defend-
ant’s appearance was unconstitutional); Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (find-
ing that the due process and equal protection requirements of the Fifth Amendment requires individu-
alized bail hearings that consider a defendant’s financial situation). 
 30 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (providing statutory authority for immigration detention); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1236.1 (providing procedures for immigration bond and immigration detention). 
 31 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (providing the statutory authority for prehearing detention of immi-
grants); Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://
www.ice.gov/ero [https://perma.cc/Z92W-DPQD] (providing that the function of ICE is in part to 
arrest and detain immigrants). 
 32 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (providing the statutory authority for prehearing detention of immi-
grants); Gilman, supra note 11, at 165, 167 (describing procedure by which ICE determines whether 
an immigrant should be initially detained upon arrest); Enforcement and Removal Operations, supra 
note 31 (providing that the function of ICE is in part to arrest and detain immigrants). 
 33 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(b). Unlike in criminal cases, where a bail hearing is automatic, a detained 
immigrant must request a bond hearing from a judge and have that request granted, in order for one to 
be held. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (providing that a judge should consider bail upon a defendant’s 
first appearance in court, but not requiring that the defendant affirmatively request that he do so), with 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(b) (providing that an immigrant must request that a judge reconsider their initial 
bond). This is significant because there is no right to government provided counsel in immigration 
proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (providing that respondents in immigration proceedings are guaran-
teed the right to counsel at no cost to the government). In other words, immigrants have the right to an 
attorney if they can afford one themselves. See id. This is unlike criminal law where defendants who 
are facing jail time have a right to an attorney whether or not they can afford one. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI (providing for the right to an attorney); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–44 
(1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel paid for by the government for indigent 
defendants extends to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 34 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (providing immigration detention procedures including bond redeter-
mination). 
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There are a few major differences between the procedures for determining 
bail in criminal cases and determining bond in immigration cases.35 First, crim-
inal case law directs judges to allow for bail unless there is strong evidence of 
a defendant’s threat of flight.36 In immigration cases, the burden is on accused 
immigrants to prove to an IJ that they do not pose a threat to their community 
and are not a flight risk.37 It is worth noting that statistics show that it is far 
more difficult for an immigrant to be granted bond than for a criminal defend-
ant to be granted bail.38 Second, whereas case law and state rules of criminal 
procedure generally require a judge to take into account a defendant’s ability to 
pay when setting a bond amount, there is no such requirement in the regula-
tions governing bond determinations in immigration proceedings.39 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Compare N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a) (listing financial situation as a factor to con-
sider when setting bail in New York), and WYO. R. CRIM. PROC. 46.1(d) (listing financial situation as 
a factor to consider when setting bail in Wyoming), with Castillo-Cajura, 2009 WL 3063742, at *1 
(finding that financial situation of an immigrant is not a relevant factor in determining bond amount), 
and Sandoval-Gomez, 2008 WL 5477710, at *1 (finding that an immigrant’s financial situation is not 
a relevant factor in the consideration of bond amount), and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (providing immigra-
tion detention procedures for bond redetermination without requiring consideration of an immigrant’s 
financial situation). 
 36 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 4–5 (providing that defendants should be granted bail as long as they are 
not an undue flight risk); Milburn, 34 U.S. at 710 (noting that bail should only be refused if a defend-
ant represents an undue flight risk); Querubin v. Commonwealth, 795 N.E.2d 534, 540 (Mass. 2003) 
(noting that there is a strong judicial interest in detaining a defendant pre-trial unless that defendant 
can show that he does not pose a flight risk). 
 37 See Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 793 (providing that danger to community and danger to national 
security should be considered when deciding whether to grant immigration bond); Patel, 15 I. & N. 
Dec. at 666 (providing that an immigrant should not be detained without bond unless he represents a 
high danger to national security or undue flight risk); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c) (providing that the 
immigrant must establish by clear and convincing evidence that they are not a danger or a flight risk). 
 38 See THOMAS COHEN & BRIAN REAVES, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY 
DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS (2007) (providing data about bail for criminal defendants); INGRID 
EAGLY & STEVEN SHAFER, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION 
COURT 17 (2016) (providing data about immigrants’ access to attorneys). A study conducted by the 
American Immigration Council indicates the difficulty in receiving bond in immigration proceedings: 
only 44% of represented immigrants and 18% of unrepresented immigrants requested, and were grant-
ed, a bond hearing. EAGLY & SHAFER, supra. Of those who requested hearings, 44% of represented 
immigrants and 11% of unrepresented immigrants were released on bond. Id. This can be compared 
with a study conducted by the Department of Justice, which found that in the 75 largest counties in the 
country, 62% of felony defendants in state court were released on bail. COHEN & REAVES, supra 
(providing statistics about criminal defendants released on bail). 
 39 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a) (listing financial situation as a factor to consider 
when setting bail in New York); WYO. R. CRIM. PROC. 46.1(d) (listing financial situation as a factor to 
consider when setting bail in Wyoming); Stack, 342 U.S. at 8 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that 
bail set higher than needed to ensure a defendant’s appearance in court violates the Eighth Amend-
ment); Castillo-Cajura, 2009 WL 3063742, at *1 (finding that financial situation of an immigrant is 
not a relevant factor in determining bond amount); Sandoval-Gomez, 2008 WL 5477710, at *1 (find-
ing that an immigrant’s financial situation is not a relevant factor in the consideration of bond 
amount); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1 (providing immigration bond procedures, which do not include considera-
tion for an immigrant’s financial situation). 
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Section A of this Part summarizes the procedures for setting bail in crimi-
nal cases.40 Section B briefly discusses the constitutional limitations placed on 
bail in criminal proceedings.41 Section C explains the procedures for determin-
ing bond in immigration cases.42 
A. Bail Procedures in Criminal Law 
Bail and pre-trial release have deep roots in American jurisprudence.43 
Although each American jurisdiction has its own rules of criminal procedure, 
the general principles of bail are essentially the same across the country.44 To 
briefly summarize, soon after a criminal defendant is charged with a crime, a 
judge (or magistrate) holds a bail determination hearing.45 During this hearing, 
the judge determines whether a defendant should be granted bail and how 
much that bail should be.46 In determining whether bail should be granted, the 
judge generally considers whether the defendant poses an unreasonably high 
risk to community safety and whether there is a strong reason to believe that 
the defendant will flee the jurisdiction regardless of bail.47 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See infra notes 43–58 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 59–70 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 71–85 and accompanying text. 
 43 See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789) (providing for the right to bail in non-
capital offenses in the newly established Northwest Territory); MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES 
§ 18, reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 37 (W. Whitmore ed. 1890) (expressing 
a right to bail in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1641); PENNSYLVANIA FRAME OF GOVERNMENT, 
art. XI, reprinted in THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3061 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) (providing for the right to bail 
in the Province of Pennsylvania in 1682). 
 44 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (providing federal bail procedures); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
§ 510.30 (providing bail procedures in New York); PA. R. CRIM. PROC. 523 (2016) (providing bail 
procedures in Pennsylvania); WYO. R. CRIM. PROC. 46.1 (providing bail procedures in Wyoming). 
 45 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (providing federal bail procedures); FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.131 (2018) 
(providing bail procedures in Florida); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 58 (2016) (providing bail proce-
dures in Massachusetts). In federal court, a bond hearing is generally held at a defendant’s initial court 
appearance. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The statute provides that for defendants charged with certain 
crimes considered to be of higher danger, a prosecutor may request a continuance of up to five days 
with which to prepare their argument as to why bail should not be granted. See id. 
 46 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (providing that during a defendant’s first court appearance, a judge 
should determine whether to grant the defendant bail, and how much the bail should be); FLA. R. 
CRIM. P. 3.131 (providing bail hearing procedures in Florida and factors a judge should consider when 
determining bail); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 57 (providing bail hearing procedures in Massachu-
setts and provides how a judge should determine whether to grant bail and how much that bail should 
be). 
 47 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (providing reasons why bail may be denied by a federal judge); FLA. R. 
CRIM. P. 3.131 (providing that a judge should grant bail if doing so would allow a defendant liberty 
without posing a threat to community or an undue flight risk); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 58 
(providing that bail should not be granted if a defendant poses a high flight risk or threat to communi-
ty); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.20 (directing judges in New York to consider the likelihood that the 
defendant will flee the jurisdiction in determining bail). Although there is variation among jurisdic-
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A judge is directed to consider several factors when determining if a de-
fendant might try to flee.48 These factors vary among jurisdictions, but primari-
ly serve two main purposes.49 First, some factors are intended to help deter-
mine a defendant’s likelihood of success at trial and the severity of the pun-
ishment if convicted.50 This is based upon the theory that a defendant with 
strong evidence against him, or one who is facing a harsh punishment if con-
victed, is more likely to flee from a jurisdiction.51 Therefore, that defendant 
may require a higher bail amount to ensure his appearance.52 Second, some 
factors are intended to help a judge determine how strongly a particular de-
fendant is tied to a jurisdiction.53 A defendant with weak ties to a jurisdiction, 
and strong ties elsewhere, presents a high risk of flight, which therefore may 
                                                                                                                           
tions, many states list certain conditions under which bail may not be granted at the discretion of the 
judge. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131 (providing that bail may not be granted in cases where a defendant 
is charged with a capital offense or an offense with a possible sentence of life imprisonment) (empha-
sis added); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 57 (providing restrictions for when bail may be granted 
based on conviction of certain crimes). 
 48 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (listing several factors for a federal judge to consider when setting 
bail); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (listing several factors for a judge to consider when setting bail 
in New York); WYO. R. CRIM. PROC. 46.1(d) (listing several factors to consider when setting bail in 
Wyoming). These factors include: 
(1) [t]he nature and circumstances of the offense charged (2) [t]he weight of the evi-
dence against the person; (3)(A) [t]he person’s character, physical and mental condi-
tion, family ties, employment, financial resources, the length of his residence in the 
community, community ties, past conduct, history related to drug or alcohol abuse, 
criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings 
WYO. R. CRIM. PROC. 46.1(d). 
 49 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (listing factors that help determine whether a defendant has motivation 
to flee due to risk of high sentence or close ties elsewhere); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (listing 
factors that help determine whether a defendant has motivation to flee due to risk of high sentence or 
close ties elsewhere in New York); WYO. R. CRIM. PROC. 46.1(d) (listing factors that help determine 
whether a defendant has motivation to flee due to risk of high sentence or close ties elsewhere in Wy-
oming). 
 50 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2) (listing weight of evidence against defendant as a factor to consider 
when setting bail at the federal level); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a)(viii), (ix) (listing weight 
of evidence against defendant and severity of sentence for the crime charged as factors to consider 
when setting bail in New York); WYO. R. CRIM. PROC. 46.1(d) (listing the type of crime charged and 
the weight of evidence against the accused as factors to consider when setting bail in Wyoming). 
 51 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 759 (finding that if the government’s purpose in pre-trial detention is 
ensuring a defendant’s appearance, bail should be set no greater than required to accomplish that pur-
pose); Stack, 342 U.S. at 5 (discussing how bail should be set at an amount commensurate with the 
need to keep a defendant from fleeing from a jurisdiction). 
 52 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 5 (providing bail procedures). 
 53 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A) (listing family ties, community ties, length of time in the com-
munity, and employment status as factors to consider when determining bond amount at the federal 
level); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(A)(ii), (iii) (listing employment, family ties, and length of 
time in the community as factors to consider when determining bond amount in New York); WYO. R. 
CRIM. PROC. 46.1(d)(3)(A) (listing family ties, community ties, length of time in the community, and 
employment status as factors to consider when determining bond amount in Wyoming). 
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necessitate a higher bail amount.54 Additionally, many jurisdictions direct 
judges to consider a defendant’s financial resources and ability to raise funds 
when setting bail amount.55 
In the criminal context, there is a propensity toward granting bail.56 This 
is based on two premises: (1) that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty; 
and (2) bail is not meant as a punishment.57 In the case that bail is not granted, 
or is granted but a party is dissatisfied with the amount, a party may challenge 
the outcome as unreasonable or unconstitutional.58 
B. Constitutional Limitations on Bail 
Throughout history, a general right to bail has been present in American 
jurisprudence both on the state and federal level.59 The Eighth Amendment to 
the Constitution bans excessively high bail amounts.60 With some qualifica-
tions, this has generally been interpreted by federal courts to guarantee a right 
to bail for criminal defendants.61 Judges may still refuse to grant bail to a de-
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 4–5 (analyzing the requirements judges should follow when determining 
bail). 
 55 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A) (directing judges to consider financial situation when setting 
bail amount at the federal level); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 58 (directing judges to consider finan-
cial resources when setting bail amount in Massachusetts); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a)(ii) 
(directing judges to consider financial resources when setting bail amount in New York); WYO. R. 
CRIM. PROC. 46.1(d)(3)(A) (directing judges to consider financial resources when setting bail amount 
in Wyoming); see also Querubin, 795 N.E.2d at 540–42 (summarizing common law considerations 
for setting bond). 
 56 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 4–5 (discussing the historic right to freedom before conviction and its 
connection to the presumption of innocence). 
 57 See id. (discussing the importance of bail in preserving the presumption of innocence for crim-
inal defendants); Milburn, 34 U.S. at 710 (discussing the purpose of bail not as a punishment but as a 
means to keep a defendant within a jurisdiction). 
 58 See 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (providing procedures for challenging bail determinations in federal 
criminal court); United States v. Golding, 742 F.2d 840, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (challenging bail assign-
ment as excessive and in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1055–56 (challeng-
ing bail as being in violation of the constitutional right of equal protection). 
 59 See Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical Per-
spectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 328–29, 337, 351, 353–54 (1982) (discussing the right to bail 
throughout the history of the United States). Of the states that achieved admittance to the Union after 
1789, all but two included a right to bail in their constitutions. See id. at 351. Since then, the right has 
largely remained intact, although some states have amended them to permit preventative detention 
which is automatic detention of defendants accused of certain crimes. See MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 15 
(providing for preventative detention for defendants charged with murder, treason, or certain violent 
felonies in Michigan); NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (providing for preventative detention for treason and 
sexual offenses in Nebraska); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 11 (providing for preventative detention for capi-
tal offenses in Texas); WISC. CONST. art 1, § 8(3) (providing legislative authority to enact preventative 
detention in Wisconsin); Verrilli, supra, at 353–54 (discussing the right to bail provided in state con-
stitutions). 
 60 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 61 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 3–4 (stating that bail set higher than what is reasonably necessary to 
ensure a defendant’s appearance is unconstitutional); Milburn, 34 U.S. at 710 (noting the constitution-
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fendant if that defendant is deemed to be too high-risk to be released, but this 
is determined on a case-by-case basis.62 
Under the Eighth Amendment, the most frequent challenges to bail are 
claims that the amount is excessive and above what is necessary to ensure a 
particular defendant’s appearance in court.63 The Supreme Court has held that 
a bail amount set above what is necessary to ensure appearance in court serves 
no purpose and thus violates the Eighth Amendment.64 
There are additional restrictions placed on bail by the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.65 One such restriction is the prohibition of master bail 
schedules that predetermine bail amounts for specific crimes.66 Courts have 
reasoned that restricting a defendant’s liberty without holding an individual-
ized hearing violates the due process and equal protection requirements of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.67 
                                                                                                                           
al importance of providing liberty to pretrial defendants); Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1157–58 (8th 
Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) (holding that under the Eighth 
Amendment, it is unconstitutional to determine bail without holding an individualized hearing). But 
see Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545–46 (1952) (stating that Congress should have the power 
within the Eighth Amendment to create laws banning defendants charged with certain crimes from 
receiving bail); United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that bail is not 
constitutionally impermissible simply because it is set to an amount higher than the defendant can 
afford). 
 62 See Hunt, 648 F.2d at 1157–58 (finding that in some circumstances it is constitutional to deny 
bail outright); Preliminary Proceedings, Fifteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United 
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1984–1985, 74 GEO. L.J. 499, 663–64 (1986) (noting 
that the government has the burden of showing a defendant’s dangerousness by clear and convincing 
evidence). 
 63 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 5 (noting that bail set at an amount more than is necessary to ensure a 
defendant’s appearance at court violates the Eighth Amendment); Golding, 742 F.2d at 841 (challeng-
ing bail assignment as excessive and in violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
 64 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 5 (noting that bail set higher than what is reasonably necessary to ensure 
a defendant’s appearance is unconstitutional); see also Beddow v. State, 68 So. 2d 503, 503 (Ala. 
1953) (finding a bail set higher than what was necessary to ensure the defendant’s appearance was 
impermissible under the Alabama constitution); Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and 
Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 909, 950–54 (2013) (discussing the constitutional right to 
be free from excessive bail). 
 65 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing for the right to due process); id. amend. XIV (requiring 
states to provide the right to due process); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970) (finding 
that under the Fourteenth Amendment it is unconstitutional to hold someone simply because they are 
unable to pay required court fees); Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1057 (finding that the due process and equal 
protection requirements of the Fifth Amendment require individualized bail hearings); Brangan v. 
Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949, 961–64 (Mass. 2017) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause requires individualized bail hearings); see also Hegreness, supra note 64, at 931–36 
(discussing the limitations placed on bail by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 66 See Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1057 (finding a master bail schedule to be unconstitutional); Brangan, 
80 N.E.3d at 959 (discussing the unconstitutionality of master bail schedules). 
 67 See Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1057 (holding that the Fifth Amendment requires individualized bail 
hearings); Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 961–64 (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment requires individu-
alized bail hearings). 
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Through these protections, as well as those found in state and federal 
statutes, courts have held that a judge must take a defendant’s ability to pay 
into consideration when setting bail.68 It is not unconstitutional per se for a 
judge to set bail that a defendant cannot afford, as long as the bail amount is 
reasonable considering all the factors a judge must consider.69 It has been 
found unconstitutional, however, for a judge to neglect to consider a defend-
ant’s financial situation when determining the amount of bail needed to ensure 
the defendant’s appearance in court.70 
C. Immigration Detention Procedures 
The procedure for detaining an immigrant in a deportation proceeding is 
generally governed by the INA and accompanying regulations.71 Upon the ar-
rest of an immigrant by an ICE agent, that agent makes a determination as to 
whether bond should be granted.72 The INA provides three options upon the 
arrest of an immigrant: (1) ICE can place the arrested immigrant in detention; 
(2) ICE can release the immigrant on a bond of $1,500 or more; or (3) ICE can 
release the immigrant on conditional parole.73 Under the INA, ICE must detain 
immigrants who have committed certain crimes.74 Beyond this mandatory de-
                                                                                                                           
 68 See Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1057 (finding that judges should consider financial situation of defend-
ant when determining bail amount); Beddow, 68 So. 2d at 503 (finding that in setting bail “considera-
tion should be given to the station in life of the defendant and the surrounding circumstances”); Cam-
era v. State, 916 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (remanding a case for examination of a 
defendant’s financial situation for the purpose of determining a reasonable bail); Brangan, 80 N.E.3d 
at 959 (finding that financial situation of a defendant must be taken into consideration when setting 
bail for the bail determination to be sufficiently individualized as the Constitution requires). 
 69 See McConnell, 842 F.2d at 107 (finding that bail is not constitutionally impermissible simply 
because it is set to an amount higher than the defendant can afford); Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 959 (not-
ing that bail is not constitutionally impermissible simply because it is set to a higher amount than the 
defendant can afford). 
 70 See Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1057 (finding that it is unconstitutional for a judge to set criminal bail 
without consideration of a defendant’s financial situation); Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 959 (holding that it 
is unconstitutional to set criminal bail without consideration of a defendant’s financial situation). 
 71 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (providing statutory authority for immigration detention); 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1003.19, 1236.1 (regulating immigration bond procedures). 
 72 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1; Gilman, supra note 11, at 165–68 (discussing the 
initial bond determination made by DHS upon apprehension of an immigrant). 
 73 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (providing three courses of action an agent may take upon arrest of an 
immigrant by DHS). “Conditional parole” is essentially the same as personal recognizance. See NAT’L 
IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW & DEFENSE § 7:12 
(2017) (defining “conditional parole”). Personal recognizance is defined as the release of a criminal 
defendant before trial without the requirement of bail. Personal Recognizance, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 74 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (requiring mandatory detention under certain circumstances). The 
crimes included under this restriction are subject to a further legal analysis, but include, among others, 
certain drug and firearm offenses. See id. § 1227(a)(2) (defining deportable offenses, which result in 
automatic detention). “Committed” is a key term here, as conviction is not actually required for man-
datory detention. See id. §§ 1182(a)(2) (listing crimes, which if “committed” would result in automat-
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tention, ICE agents have the authority to determine whether or not to grant an 
immigrant bond.75 The relevant regulation states that an on-scene ICE agent 
may release an immigrant on bond or conditional parole if the agent deter-
mines that the immigrant in question does not pose a significant threat to the 
safety of others and that the immigrant is likely to appear at immigration pro-
ceedings.76 
An immigrant generally has the ability to request a rehearing on the ques-
tion of bond if they are unsatisfied with the initial determination made by 
ICE.77 A bond redetermination hearing before an IJ is not automatic; it must be 
requested by the immigrant or his representative.78 This hearing is considered 
separate from any other proceedings in which an immigrant may be participat-
ing.79 
During a bond hearing in immigration court, an IJ must first determine 
whether the immigrant has committed a specified crime that would represent a 
statutory bar to bond.80 This decision can be subject to a substantial amount of 
                                                                                                                           
ic detention), 1226(c) (providing that immigrants who have “committed” certain offenses should be 
automatically detained), 1227(a)(2) (providing that immigrants who have “committed” certain offens-
es should be deported). If an immigrant admits to an act, or admits to the elements of an act, mandato-
ry detention may be required as if the immigrant had been convicted of the crime. See id. §§ 1182, 
1226(c), 1227(a)(2). 
 75 See id. § 1226(a) (establishing the procedures for ICE agents determining initial bond); Gil-
man, supra note 11, at 165 (describing the authority of DHS to determine the initial bond of immi-
grant detainees). 
 76 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (providing the procedures for ICE agents); Gilman, supra note 11, at 
165 (describing the authority of DHS to determine the initial bond of immigrant detainees). 
 77 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (allowing access to a bond redetermination hearing upon request of an 
immigrant detainee); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (establishing procedures for bond redetermination hearings); 
EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE 
MANUAL 141–42 (2017) (describing procedures for immigration bond redetermination hearings); 
Gilman, supra note 11, at 169–71 (describing the bond redetermination hearing process). A recent 
decision by the Supreme Court has prohibited certain immigrants from seeking  bond redetermination 
hearings. Nielsen v. Preap, No. 16-1363, 2019 WL 1245517, at *10–11 (S. Ct. Mar. 19, 2019). In 
Nielsen v. Preap, the Court found that it is permissible to deny hearings to immigrants who have been 
previously convicted of crimes that result in mandatory detention under § 1226(c), even if the immi-
grant has already been released from prison for the previous crime. Id. 
 78 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(b) (establishing procedures for bond redetermination). The requirement 
of a request in order for a hearing to be held is significant, as many respondents in immigration pro-
ceedings are pro se, and statistics show that they request and are granted release at a much lower rate 
than immigrants with counsel. See EAGLY & SHAFER, supra note 38, at 9, 17 (noting the low percent-
ages of immigrants who obtain counsel, as well as the low number of pro se immigrants who request 
bond redetermination hearings). 
 79 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) (providing procedures for bond redetermination). In practice this 
means that during a bond hearing, an immigration judge is supposed to consider the evidence being 
presented solely for the purpose of determining bond. See id. The judge should not be influenced by 
the evidence when determining an immigrant’s other requests for relief. See id. 
 80 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (listing crimes which make an immigrant inadmissible), 1226(c) (requir-
ing that immigrants who have committed certain crimes be automatically detained), 1227(a)(2) (listing 
crimes that make an immigrant deportable). 
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discretion for two reasons: (1) a judge must determine whether the immigrant 
has “committed” the crime, which involves an examination of the immigrant’s 
actions and his legal criminal history; and (2) a judge must also consider 
whether a particular crime is considered one of “moral turpitude.”81 The Board 
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has defined crimes involving moral turpitude 
as crimes involving conduct “which is so far contrary to the moral law, as in-
terpreted by the general moral sense of the community, that the offender is 
brought to public disgrace, is no longer generally respected, or is deprived of 
social recognition by good living persons.”82 
If an immigrant remains eligible for bond after the IJ reviews his past 
criminal conduct, the IJ is then directed to consider three factors in determin-
ing whether to release the immigrant on bond: (1) whether the immigrant pre-
sents a threat to the community; (2) whether the immigrant presents a threat to 
national security; and (3) whether the immigrant is a flight risk.83 The IJ can 
consider evidence submitted by both sides in determining whether to grant 
bond.84 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2) (listing “crimes including moral turpitude” as a crime that would 
make an immigrant inadmissible), 1226(c) (identifying crimes that would make an immigrant inad-
missible or deportable as crimes that would result in automatic detention), 1227(a)(2) (listing “crimes 
involving moral turpitude” as a crime that would make an immigrant deportable). This term, moral 
turpitude, has been used in immigration law since the Immigration Act of 1891. See Immigration Act 
of 1891, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891) (providing that if an immigrant has committed crimes involving moral 
turpitude they should not be admitted into the United States). It has been generally defined by the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and upheld by the Supreme Court, as sufficiently specific to 
satisfy due process requirements. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1951) (finding that 
the term moral turpitude is not unconstitutionally vague); Matter of D–, 1 I. & N. Dec. 190, 194 
(B.I.A. 1942) (defining moral turpitude). But see Isius-Veloz v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 1249, 1261 (9th 
Cir. 2019) (Fletcher, C.J., concurring) (stating that “moral turpitude” should be found to be unconsti-
tutionally vague). In practice, although case law has established whether many crimes are considered 
to involve moral turpitude, a judge may have to look to the elements of a particular crime to determine 
whether it fits the definition established by the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1226(c), 1227(a)(2); Mat-
ter of D–, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 194; 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1. See generally DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. 
ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES § 6:2 (2017) (summarizing case law defining certain 
crimes as crimes involving moral turpitude and stating that in determining whether a crime involves 
moral turpitude an IJ should look at the elements of the crime charged rather than the actions commit-
ted by the immigrant). 
 82 Matter of D–, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 194. 
 83 See Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 793 (finding that IJs should consider an immigrant’s threat to 
national security, threat to community safety and flight risk when determining bond); Patel, 15 I. & N. 
Dec. at 666 (finding that bond should be granted so long as an immigrant does not pose a high safety 
risk or an undue flight risk); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h) (providing that an immigrant needs to show “that 
release would not pose a danger to other persons or to property [and] that the alien is likely to appear 
for any scheduled proceeding or interview”). 
 84 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1236.1 (providing immigration bond redetermination hearing proce-
dures); EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 77 (identifying procedures for immigra-
tion bond redetermination hearings). The law does not direct an IJ to consider any factors beyond 
these three when determining bond, and the BIA has specifically held that evidence of an immigrant’s 
financial situation is irrelevant to bond determinations. See Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 793 (finding 
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS AND THE POLICY 
DANGER OF AN IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM  
THAT DOES NOT VALUE LIBERTY 
Despite the fact the criminal bail and immigration bond serve effectively 
the same goals, they are notably different in a number of critical ways.85 To 
understand why, and whether this divergence is justified, it is instructive to 
explore two questions have been central to shaping the modern immigration 
system in the United States.86 The first is if and when constitutional protections 
should apply to immigrants who have no legal status.87 This has been an ongo-
ing discussion and has been decided differently depending on courts’ interpre-
tation of the phrase “the people” or “persons” as those terms are used in the 
Constitution.88 The second question is if immigrants do have certain rights, 
when should immigration procedures follow those of criminal law and when 
                                                                                                                           
that IJs should consider an immigrant’s threat to national security as well as threat to community safe-
ty when determining bond); Castillo-Cajura, 2009 WL 3063742, at *1 (finding that financial situation 
of an immigrant is not a relevant factor in determining bond amount); Sandoval-Gomez, 2008 WL 
5477710, at *1 (finding that an immigrant’s financial situation is not a relevant factor in the considera-
tion of bond amount); Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 666 (finding that bond should be granted so long as an 
immigrant does not pose a high safety risk or an undue flight risk); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h) (providing 
immigration bond procedures and what must be shown to be granted bond). 
 85 Compare N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a) (McKinney 2012) (listing financial situation 
as a factor to consider when setting bail in New York), and WYO. R. CRIM. PROC. 46.1(d) (2018) 
(listing financial situation as a factor to consider when setting bail in Wyoming), with In re Castillo-
Cajura, No. A089 853 733, 2009 WL 3063742, at *1 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 2009) (finding that financial 
situation of an immigrant is not a relevant factor in determining bond amount), and In re Sandoval-
Gomez, No. AXXX XX3 965, 2008 WL 5477710, at *1 (B.I.A. Dec. 15, 2008) (finding that an immi-
grant’s financial situation is not a relevant factor in the consideration of bond amount), and 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.19 (2018) (providing immigration detention procedures for bond redetermination without 
requiring consideration of an immigrant’s financial situation). 
 86 See Plyler v. Doe (Plyler II), 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982) (discussing whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment should apply to non-legal immigrants); Legomsky, supra note 13, at 472 (discussing the 
development of immigration law out of criminal law). 
 87 See Plyler II, 457 U.S. at 205 (deciding whether Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights 
applied to non-legal immigrants). 
 88 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261, 265 (1990) (analyzing whether 
non-resident aliens are included in “the People” for Fourth Amendment protection); Plyler II, 457 
U.S. at 210 (deciding whether non-legal immigrants are included in “persons” for Fourteenth 
Amendment protections); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596–97 (1953) (discussing 
whether immigrants are “persons” for Fifth Amendment protection); United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 
643 F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2011) (considering whether non-legal immigrants are included in “the 
People” for Second Amendment protection); Mathilda McGee-Tubb, Comment, Sometimes You’re In, 
Sometimes You’re Out: Undocumented Immigrants and the Fifth Circuit’s Definition of “the People” 
in United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 53 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPP. 75, 75 (2012), https://lawdigitalcommons.
bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3235&context=bclr [http://perma.cc/J958-K8ND] (exploring the 
inconsistent nature in which courts have defined “the people” in terms of constitutional rights). 
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should the two diverge.89 This question is important because although immi-
gration proceedings are officially classified as civil, the restriction of the im-
migrant’s liberty often makes the proceedings seem more like criminal pro-
ceedings.90 In this Part, Section A discusses how courts have interpreted vari-
ous constitutional amendments in deciding if and when those constitutional 
rights should apply to non-legal immigrants.91 Section B lays out the ways in 
which criminal bail and immigration bond have diverged.92 Section C explores 
recent cases supplying authority for following criminal bail procedures in the 
immigration bond context.93 
A. When Does “The People” Mean All of the People? 
Before addressing what procedures an adjudicator should follow in an 
immigration hearing, it is first important to understand what constitutional pro-
tections, if any, non-legal immigrants have in the United States, a topic of sig-
nificant debate.94 The term “The People” or “persons” is used throughout the 
U. S. Constitution.95 The document’s preamble begins with the well-known 
phrase “We The People of the United States.”96 A question for lawyers dealing 
with non-legal immigrants, therefore, became who should be included as “The 
People.”97 This question is important not just because it involves the identity of 
the United States as a nation, but because its answer determines who is afford-
ed the vital rights that make up the core of the democracy in this country.98 
                                                                                                                           
 89 See Gilman, supra note 11, at 203–07 (discussing the uneven borrowing of criminal law con-
siderations in the immigration system); Legomsky, supra note 13, at 482–84, 487–90, 494–501 (dis-
cussing the similarities and differences between criminal and immigration procedures). 
 90 See Gilman supra note 11, at 195 (discussing the uneven borrowing of criminal law considera-
tions in the immigration system); Legomsky, supra, note 13, at 500–02 (discussing the similarities and 
differences between criminal and immigration procedures); Sacchetti, supra note 8 (discussing the 
practice of having immigrant respondents appear in chains). In a recent episode of Last Week Tonight 
with John Oliver, John Oliver displayed a clip of an interview with an IJ who stated, “in essence we’re 
doing death penalty cases in a traffic court setting.” Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: The Immi-
gration Courts (HBO television broadcast Apr. 1, 2018). 
 91 See infra notes 94–117 and accompanying text. 
 92 See infra notes 118–153 and accompanying text. 
 93 See infra notes 154–183 and accompanying text. 
 94 See McGee-Tubb, supra note 88, at 75–76 (discussing the debate over whether constitutional 
rights should apply to non-legal immigrants). 
 95 See U.S. CONST. amend. II (providing the right to bear arms for “the people”); id. amend. IV 
(providing the right to be secure in one’s home for “the people”); id. amend. V (providing criminal 
procedure protections for “persons”); id. amend. XIV (providing due process and equal protection for 
“persons”). 
 96 Id. pmbl. 
 97 See McGee-Tubb, supra note 88, at 75–76 (discussing the significance of the term “The Peo-
ple” in the analysis of whether constitutional rights apply to non-legal immigrants). 
 98 See id. (considering the importance of constitutional language in determining whether constitu-
tional rights apply to non-legal immigrants); see also Raoul Lowery Contreras, Yes Illegal Aliens Have 
Constitutional Rights, THE HILL (Sept. 29, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/
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1. “The People” Inclusive: Rights That Have Been Found to Apply to Non-
Legal Immigrants 
Among the most famous cases involving the constitutional rights of non-
legal immigrants is Plyler v. Doe (Plyler II), in which the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause applied 
to non-legal immigrants.99 This case arose out of an attempt by the State of 
Texas to pass a law withholding funding from public schools that admitted 
non-legal immigrant children.100 The policy was challenged on the grounds 
that doing so violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.101 The Supreme Court found the Equal Protection Clause applies to all 
people residing in a jurisdiction regardless of immigration status.102 The Court 
concluded that the Clause was meant as a check on state governments and was 
an effort by the federal government to ensure that anyone who was subjected 
to the laws of a jurisdiction would be guaranteed the same constitutional pro-
tections within that jurisdiction, regardless of immigration status.103 
                                                                                                                           
255281-yes-illegal-aliens-have-constitutional-rights [https://perma.cc/4ZC3-77Y7] (discussing the 
constitutional rights of non-legal immigrants). An example of this can be found in the Second 
Amendment, which reads, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II (empha-
sis added). 
 99 See Plyler II, 457 U.S. at 205 (considering the constitutional rights of non-legal immigrants). 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads, in relevant part: 
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liber-
ty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 100 See Plyler II, 457 U.S. at 205. The state’s proffered justification for this law was that public 
schools’ limited funding should be reserved for students who have legal status. See id. at 207. The 
Supreme Court noted, however, that because schools received funding at both the state and federal 
level based on enrollment, preventing children without legal status from enrolling would do little to 
improve schools. See id. 
 101 See Doe v. Plyler (Plyler I), 458 F. Supp. 569, 572 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aff’d 628 F.2d 448 (5th 
Cir. 1980), aff’d Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (the District Court case that eventually was ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court as Plyler II). 
 102 See Plyler II, 457 U.S. at 212 (finding that the Due Process Clause applies to non-legal immi-
grants). 
 103 See id. at 214 (considering the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment); CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (providing the legislative history for the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). In support of the Amendment, Representative John Bingham of Ohio said the follow-
ing, “[i]s it not essential to the unity of the Government and the unity of the people that all persons, 
whether citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have equal protection in every State in this Union 
in the rights of life and liberty and property?” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090. 
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In Plyler II, the Court focused on territorial boundaries as an indicator of 
constitutional rights.104 It reasoned that the purpose of constitutional protec-
tions was to ensure that all people present within a jurisdiction’s territorial 
boundaries, and thus subject to its laws, should have basic constitutional pro-
tections.105 This focus on territorial boundaries as an indicator of constitutional 
rights echoes that of previous decisions regarding the constitutional rights of 
non-legal immigrants.106 When individuals interact with the government, there 
is a risk that the individuals will be treated unfairly due to the inherent power 
imbalance between them and the government.107 The purpose of the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments is thus to protect people from the risk of 
governmental overreach.108 Therefore, the legal status of a person should not 
matter; if a person is subjected to the laws of a jurisdiction, then that person 
should have the benefit of constitutional protections.109 This territorial jurisdic-
tion analysis has generally been applied to determine when non-legal immi-
grants should have rights.110 If a person is subjected to domestic laws of a ju-
                                                                                                                           
 104 See Plyler II, 457 U.S. at 214 (discussing the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment as being a 
jurisdictional protection). 
 105 See id. (discussing the jurisdictional purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 106 See id. at 212–14 (deciding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects all those within a particu-
lar jurisdiction and citing previous cases that had similar holdings); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 
U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to any person within a 
territorial jurisdiction regardless of immigration status); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 
(1886) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to any person 
within a territorial jurisdiction regardless of immigration status). 
 107 See Plyler II, 457 U.S. at 211–12 (discussing the purpose of constitutional amendments). 
 108 See id. 
 109 See id. (discussing the jurisdictional nature of certain constitutional amendments); Wong 
Wing, 163 U.S. at 238 (holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to any person within a 
territorial jurisdiction regardless of immigration status); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369 (holding that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to any person within a territorial jurisdic-
tion regardless of immigration status). The Eighth Amendment may also apply to non-legal immi-
grants. See Caballero v. Caplinger, 914 F. Supp. 1374, 1380 (E.D. La. 1996) (holding that a statute 
denying bail hearings to non-legal immigrants violated the Eighth Amendment). When faced with the 
question of whether the Eighth Amendment should guarantee bond to non-legal immigrants, however, the 
Supreme Court decided that as there was no absolute “right to bail,” a statute allowing the Attorney Gen-
eral to deny bond to non-legal immigrants was constitutional. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544 
(1952). It would follow then that although the federal government has the constitutional right to deny 
bond outright, if it is to grant bond, the bond may not be excessive. See id.; Caballero, 914 F. Supp. at 
1380. Although one district court, the Eastern District of Louisiana, has held this, when the argument was 
made in Hernandez v. Sessions, the Ninth Circuit declined to discuss the argument and instead decided 
the case on other grounds. Hernandez v. Sessions (Hernandez II), 872 F.3d 976, 990 n.16 (9th Cir. 
2017); Caballero, 914 F. Supp at 1380. 
 110 See Plyler II, 457 U.S. at 211–12 (discussing when constitutional amendments should apply to 
non-legal immigrants); Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238 (holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
apply to any person within a territorial jurisdiction regardless of immigration status); Yick Wo, 118 
U.S. at 369 (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to any person 
within a territorial jurisdiction regardless of immigration status). 
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risdiction, they should have constitutional rights protecting them from the 
overreach of that jurisdiction.111 
2. “The People” Exclusive: Rights That Have Been Found to Not Apply to 
Non-Legal Immigrants 
A decision from the Fifth Circuit discussing constitutional rights of non-
legal immigrants followed a different path than cases previously discussed.112 
In United States v. Portillo-Munoz, the court considered a challenge to a feder-
al statute banning non-legal immigrants from possessing firearms.113 In its de-
cision, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the statutory interpretation of the 
Second Amendment carried out by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia 
v. Heller.114 The Fifth Circuit found that Second Amendment rights only ap-
plied to law-abiding citizens, not all people within a geographic area.115 By 
adopting the Heller Court’s definition of “The People,” the Fifth Circuit 
strayed by refusing to apply the term to all people in the jurisdiction and rather 
reserved it for citizens.116 The question of whether Second Amendment rights 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See Plyler II, 457 U.S. at 211–12; Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238 (holding that the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments apply to any person within a territorial jurisdiction regardless of immigration sta-
tus); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369 (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies to any person within a territorial jurisdiction regardless of immigration status). 
 112 See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442 (finding that the Second Amendment should not apply to 
non-legal immigrants); McGee-Tubb, supra note 88, at 82–84 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
in Portillo-Munoz). But see Plyler II, 457 U.S. at 211–12 (providing Fifth Amendment protections to 
immigrants); Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238 (providing constitutional protections to immigrants); Yick 
Wo, 118 U.S. at 369 (providing Due Process protections to immigrants). 
 113 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 439. The defendant in this case had been arrested for possession 
of a firearm which he used to protect chickens from coyotes at his ranch in rural Texas. See id. 
 114 See id. at 439–40 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580–82 (2008)). In 
Heller, a police officer challenged, on Second Amendment grounds, a city ordinance that prevented 
him from bringing his service weapon home. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 575–76. The Heller Court carry-
ing out a historical analysis of the term “the people” found that rather than applying to all people with-
in a territorial jurisdiction, “the people” should be read as being a specific subset of the population 
made up of Americans. See id. at 580–82. Although Heller did not involve any discussion of rights of 
immigrants, the Portillo-Munoz court found the Court’s analysis of the Second Amendment instruc-
tive in its decision. See id.; Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 439–40, 442. Using the Heller Court’s inter-
pretation of “the people,” the Fifth Circuit found that “the People” in the Second Amendment was 
intended to apply only to law-abiding citizens. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 580–82; Portillo-Munoz, 643 
F.3d at 439–40, 442. 
 115 See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442 (considering whether the Second Amendment applies to 
non-legal immigrants). As discussed earlier, the text of the Second and Fourth Amendments include 
the phrase “The People,” whereas the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments include “Persons.” See U.S. 
CONST. amend. II (providing the right to bear arms for “the people”); id. amend. IV (providing the 
right to be secure in one’s home for “the people”); id. amend. V (providing criminal procedure protec-
tions for “persons”); id. amend. XIV (providing due process and equal protection for “persons”). 
 116 See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442 (using reasoning from Heller to find that the Second 
Amendment should not apply to non-legal immigrants). But see Plyler II, 457 U.S. at 210 (recogniz-
ing that non-legal immigrants have historically been considered “persons” for constitutional analysis). 
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apply to non-legal immigrants has not yet been discussed by the Supreme 
Court, so it remains to be seen how this new statutory interpretation will affect 
future debates on the constitutional rights of non-legal immigrants.117 
B. The Divergence of Immigration Bond from Criminal Bail 
In theory, criminal bail and immigration bond serve the same purpose.118 
They both represent a tool used by the government to ensure that individuals 
appear at court hearings when they are suspected of having violated either a 
criminal law or an immigration law.119 The Supreme Court has used criminal 
bail procedures as a guide in their interpretation of immigration detention pro-
cedures, and to an extent, the procedures developed for immigration detention 
have indeed matched those of its criminal counterparts.120 Immigration deten-
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442; McGee-Tubb, supra note 88, at 87 (discussing the effect 
of the Portillo-Munoz decision). The Fifth Circuit’s holding with respect to the Second Amendment 
rights of non-legal immigrants has been adopted by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits. See United States 
v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 978–79 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that the Second Amendment right to 
bear arms should not apply to non-legal immigrants); United States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022, 1022–23 
(8th Cir. 2011) (finding that the right to bear arms should not apply to non-legal immigrants). The 
Seventh Circuit has concluded otherwise and held that Second Amendment rights do apply to non-
legal immigrants. See United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding 
that non-legal immigrants should be protected by the Second Amendment). The Seventh Circuit held 
that despite this, a statute restricting a non-legal immigrant’s access to guns was constitutional within 
the Second Amendment. See id. at 673 (finding a statute restricting the gun rights of non-legal immi-
grants to be constitutional). 
 118 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2018) (providing judges should release defendants on bail if 
they find that it is unlikely that they will pose a threat to their community, or flee the jurisdiction), and 
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1951) (finding that bail should be tailored to ensuring a defendant’s 
appearance at court events), and Querubin v. Commonwealth, 795 N.E.2d 534, 540 (Mass. 2003) 
(noting a primary purpose of bail as being to a means to ensure a defendant’s appearance at trial), with 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (noting that the primary justification for immigration 
detention is ensuring a immigrants’ appearance in court, and protecting against any threat that an 
immigrant might pose), and In re Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666, 666–67 (B.I.A. 1976) (finding that in 
determining immigration bond, an IJ should consider the flight risk posed by a particular immigrant 
and any danger they might pose to their community or national security). 
 119 Compare Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (noting the primary purpose of immigration detention), 
and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (providing that immigrants may be released on bond so long as they prove 
they are not a danger to the community or a flight risk), with 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (providing statutory 
authority for pretrial detention in criminal law), and Stack, 342 U.S. at 4–5 (discussing the purpose of 
pre-trial detention). 
 120 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–91 (using criminal procedure as a guide for interpreting immi-
gration detention procedures); Gilman, supra note 11, at 197, 203–05 (discussing selective integration 
of criminal detention procedures into the immigration detention system); Legomsky, supra note 13, at 
489–90, 494–500 (discussing similarities between criminal bail procedures and immigration bond 
procedures); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127–28 (1996) (holding that criminal bail proce-
dures should act as a guide in situations that involve depravation of liberty). 
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tion, however, has diverged from pre-trial detention in several significant 
ways.121 
1. The Immigration Detention System and Its Attachment to Monetary 
Bond 
Monetary bail has traditionally held a place in the criminal context to en-
sure defendants appear at their required court appearances.122 Recently, how-
ever, many jurisdictions have moved away from requiring monetary bond 
when possible.123 This shift in policy was influenced by growing agreement as 
to monetary bail’s ineffectiveness.124 Robust pretrial service systems are now 
preferred to monetary bail, and policy-makers as well as academics argue that 
they are more effective both in terms of ensuring a defendant’s appearance and 
in ensuring that liberty is not unnecessarily infringed.125 
Despite this shift in criminal procedure, no such movement has occurred 
in immigration detention.126 Due to the immigration system’s reliance on mon-
etary bond, immigrant respondents are often not able to obtain liberty due to a 
                                                                                                                           
 121 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (discussing the importance of only using immigration detention 
when it is necessary to fulfill the purpose of ensuring court appearances and preventing undue com-
munity danger); Gilman, supra note 11, at 196–97, 200–02 (discussing how criminal jurisdictions are 
beginning to use alternative methods to detention which often times are more effective and the immi-
gration system has failed to follow suit). 
 122 See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789) (providing a right to monetary bail in 
the Northwest Territory); Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 710 (1835) (noting the purpose of 
bail as being a means of keeping a defendant present in a jurisdiction); Querubin, 795 N.E.2d at 540–
42 (noting the historic importance of bail to ensuring a defendant’s appearance at trial). 
 123 See Gilman, supra note 11, at 199–201 (discussing the movement away from monetary bail 
for many jurisdictions). 
 124 See id. at 198–201; Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 13, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/K69H-PJGQ] (summa-
rizing problems with monetary bail). 
 125 See Gilman, supra note 11, at 198–201 (noting a shift away from pretrial detention among 
some jurisdictions). An example can be found in the District of Columbia. See id. at 200 (discussing 
pre-trial services in the District of Columbia); Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia, 
https://www.psa.gov [https://perma.cc/7J2E-YDYD] (outlining the services provided by the Pretrial 
Services Agency). The District, through its pretrial services agency, has expanded non-monetary bail 
options for criminal defendants. See D.C. CODE § 23-1303(h) (1999) (authorizing the pretrial services 
agency to implement these non-monetary bail options); Pretrial Services Agency for the District of 
Columbia, supra (providing that the PSA provides several services to released pretrial defendants 
including drug treatment). This program has resulted in a higher portion of defendants appearing at 
court events, as well as lower rates of crimes committed by those released. See Gilman, supra note 11, 
at 200 (noting the reduced rate of released defendants fleeing the jurisdiction as well as the lower rate 
of released defendant’s committing violent crimes). 
 126 See Gilman, supra note 11, at 201–02 (discussing the failure to shift away from monetary 
bond in the immigration detention system); Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 
38 CARDOZO L. REV. 2141, 2143 (2017) (noting the reliance of the immigration system on monetary 
bond despite other alternatives). Based on ICE budget proposals, the number of detained immigrants 
was expected to increase in 2018. See Wamsley, supra note 9 (noting that President Trump requested 
a $1.2 billion increase in ICE’s budget to pay for increased detention). 
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lack of funds.127 One explanation for the immigration system’s continued reli-
ance on monetary bond is the way in which the bond is determined.128 Unlike 
in criminal law, the initial decision on whether an immigrant respondent 
should be required to pay bond is decided by an ICE agent rather than a 
judge.129 This agent is subject to outside influences which may encourage a 
determination of detention.130 For example, the agency is mandated by Con-
gress to keep their number of detained immigrants at a certain level.131 This 
could create pressure for DHS to detain up to the point of capacity without a 
detailed individual analysis of whether detention is appropriate in each case.132 
Only after this initial determination is made does an immigrant have the 
opportunity to seek a decision from an IJ on the issue of pre-hearing release.133 
There are potential issues at the adjudicative stage as well, however, as judges 
in immigration courts are not Article III judges, but rather administrative judg-
es employed through the Department of Justice.134 Although they operate in 
the DOJ rather than the DHS, IJs are still executive branch employees operat-
ing within the same immigration control structure as ICE agents and thus may 
be subject to pressures from the Attorney General or the President.135 
The two-step bond determination process inherently results in an empha-
sis on monetary bond due to a number of additional factors.136 For example, 
during their preliminary assessment, DHS agents overwhelmingly assign mon-
etary bond in the rare cases in which they determine that an immigrant should 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See BYRNE ET AL., supra note 18, at 25, 30 (describing experiences of immigrants who were 
granted monetary bond but remained detained due to their inability to pay); INSECURE COMMUNITIES, 
supra note 18, at 11 (noting that in New York, 55% of immigrants who are granted monetary bond are 
unable to pay it and thus remain detained). 
 128 See Gilman, supra note 11, at 174–77; see also Marouf, supra note 126, at 2147–48 (noting 
that DHS, the first decision maker in the immigration detention process interprets “custody” to mean 
detention and thus automatically detains large groups of people). 
 129 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2018) (providing that the Attorney General makes the initial detention 
determination for an arrested immigrant); Gilman, supra note 11, at 165 (discussing procedure for 
initial bond determination by DHS). 
 130 See Gilman, supra note 11, at 183–85 (discussing influences on the initial bond determination 
by DHS). 
 131 Id. at 183. 
 132 See id. at 183–184 (discussing the pressures on ICE to detain up to capacity); Sarah Childress, 
Why ICE Released Those 2,000 Immigrant Detainees, FRONTLINE (Mar. 19, 2013), https://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/frontline/article/why-ice-released-those-2000-immigrant-detainees/ [https://perma.cc/
ME5B-8AD8] (describing the release of non-violent low risk immigrants who had been detained by 
DHS once DHS reached its budgetary maximum). 
 133 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (providing statutory authority for bond redetermination); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.19 (providing procedures for bond redetermination hearings). 
 134 See Gilman, supra note 11, at 169 (noting that IJs are not Article III judges). 
 135 See id. 
 136 See id. at 195–97 (discussing the bond determination process and its emphasis on monetary 
bond). 
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be released from initial arrest without detention.137 The lack of access to coun-
sel for immigrant respondents is another factor that contributes to the disparity 
in use of monetary bond.138 As immigrant respondents must affirmatively re-
quest bond redetermination hearings, and then make legal arguments as to why 
they deserve release on no bond, it can be expected that the rate of success for 
pro se respondents would be low.139 
2. Immigration Courts’ Lack of Individualized Bond Determinations 
Even if an immigrant acquires legal counsel and requests an individual-
ized bond hearing, monetary bond remains the likely result.140 This is partially 
the result of the lack of factors considered in immigration hearings as com-
pared to criminal bail proceedings.141 As discussed above, the sole factors con-
sidered by immigration courts when determining bond are (1) whether the im-
migrant has committed any of the “mandatory detention” crimes; (2) danger to 
national security; (3) danger to community; and (4) flight risk.142 The evidence 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 45, 50 (2014) (noting the high rates of immigrants detained in Baltimore after the origi-
nal DHS agent detention determination); see also Decisions on ICE Detainees: State by State Details, 
TRAC IMMIGRATION (May 22, 2013) http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/320/ [https://perma.cc/
CH5H-LF7K] (finding that in 2013, 4% of detainees were released without monetary bond after their 
initial ICE custody determination). 
 138 See Gilman, supra note 11, at 201 (discussing the lack of counsel for many immigrants and 
how this leads to reliance on monetary bond). 
 139 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (providing that immigrants must affirmatively request bond redetermi-
nation hearings); EAGLY & SHAFER, supra note 38, at 17 (noting the negative effect which lack of 
counsel has on the likelihood of success for immigrant respondents). 
 140 See Gilman, supra note 11, at 195–96 (noting that release for immigrants without monetary 
bail is rare). 
 141 Compare N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a) (listing financial situation as a factor to con-
sider when setting bail in New York), and WYO. RULES. CRIM. PROC. 46.1(d) (listing financial situa-
tion as a factor to consider when setting bail in Wyoming), with In re Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. 791, 793 
(B.I.A. 2016) (finding that IJs should consider an immigrant’s threat to national security as well as 
threat to community safety when determining bond but not directing them to consider financial situa-
tion of the defendant), and Castillo-Cajura, 2009 WL 3063742, at *1 (finding that financial situation 
of an immigrant is not a relevant factor in determining bond amount), and Sandoval-Gomez, 2008 WL 
5477710, at *1 (finding that an immigrant’s financial situation is not a relevant factor in the considera-
tion of bond amount), and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (providing immigration detention procedures for bond 
redetermination without requiring consideration of an immigrant’s financial situation).  
 142 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (listing crimes which would make an immigrant inadmissible), 1226(c) 
(providing that immigrants who have committed certain crimes should be automatically detained), 
1227(a)(2) (providing crimes which make an immigrant deportable); Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 793 
(finding that IJs should consider an immigrant’s threat to national security, threat to community safety 
and flight risk when determining bond); Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 666 (finding that bond should be 
granted so long as an immigrant does not pose a high safety risk or an undue flight risk); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.19(h) (providing that in order to be released an immigrant needs to show that he is not a dan-
ger to people or property, and that he is likely to return for hearings). 
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presented by the respondent can only be tailored to proving those require-
ments.143 
This differs from criminal law, where courts consider a broad array of fac-
tors relevant both in terms of a defendant’s likelihood to appear at court events 
and a defendant’s likelihood to commit another crime while on pre-trial re-
lease.144 There is no room in the limited immigration bond redetermination 
hearing for consideration of these factors found to be relevant in criminal 
law.145 
This difference in procedure remains despite the fact that the immigration 
system often treats immigrants as if they were criminal defendants.146 Pre-
hearing detention in the two systems is used for essentially the same pur-
pose.147 Additionally, the same criminal enforcement apparatus is often used to 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See Castillo-Cajura, 2009 WL 3063742, at *1 (finding that financial situation of an immigrant 
is not a relevant factor in determining bond amount); Sandoval-Gomez, 2008 WL 5477710, at *1 
(finding that an immigrant’s financial situation is not a relevant factor in the consideration of bond 
amount); EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 77, at 141–42 (2017) (providing pro-
cedures for immigration bond redetermination hearings including the presentation of evidence). 
 144 See Gilman, supra note 11, at 204–07 (discussing various factors used to determine bail in the 
criminal context including: family ties, financial resources, and presence of a support system for the 
defendant should he be released). Empirical research has identified certain factors that can help to 
predict when a criminal defendant will pose a high risk to their community or an undue risk of fight. 
See id. at 205. Using these studies, guides have been developed for judges to use in pretrial bail hear-
ings to more accurately match bail amounts to the risk posed by a defendant. See id. at 205–06. The 
nature of the immigration bond redetermination does not allow for the introduction of factors such as 
financial situation. See Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 793 (finding that IJs should consider an immigrant’s 
threat to national security as well as threat to community safety when determining bond but not direct-
ing them to consider financial situation of the defendant); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (providing immigration 
detention procedures for bond redetermination without requiring consideration of an immigrant’s 
financial situation or other). 
 145 See Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 793 (providing factors for IJs to consider when determining 
bond); Castillo-Cajura, 2009 WL 3063742, at *1 (finding that financial status should not be a taken 
into consideration when determining bond); Sandoval-Gomez, 2008 WL 5477710, at *1 (finding that 
financial situation is irrelevant in the consideration of a bond amount); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (providing 
factors to consider when determining bond); Gilman, supra note 11, at 204–07 (discussing various 
factors used to determine bail in the criminal context including financial resources). 
 146 See Legomsky, supra note 13, at 475–98 (discussing inclusion of certain criminal procedures 
into immigration law including use of local police and plea bargaining). 
 147 Compare Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (summarizing the goals of immigration detention as to 
ensure a defendant does not pose a danger to the community or an undue flight risk), with Carbo v. 
United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 669 (1962) (holding that rejection of bail was merited as the defendant 
posed a significant threat to his community), and Milburn, 34 U.S. at 710 (noting that the purpose of 
bail is to keep a defendant present in a jurisdiction to face trial). It is also worth noting that immigra-
tion officials often engage in a practice similar to plea bargaining in the criminal context. See Legom-
sky, supra note 13, at 494–95 (discussing “plea” deals in the immigration context). In exchange for 
information on criminal targets, immigration officials will sometimes grant immigrants with tempo-
rary legal status. See id. Additionally, there are cases where immigrants have been granted less per-
manent (and thus less desirable) forms of immigration relief in exchange for forgoing their asylum 
applications. See id. 
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arrest and detain immigrants as is used in the criminal context.148 Finally, the 
public often considers non-legal immigrants as being similar to criminals.149 
Many within the public view non-legal immigrants as lawbreakers and this 
may influence the development of immigration policy.150 Despite the similari-
ties between the purpose and perception of detention in the criminal and immi-
gration systems, bail determination hearings for criminal detainees are far 
more detailed than they are for immigrants.151 The consideration of financial 
resources, and other individual factors, is a procedural protection that can often 
be the difference between liberty and detention.152 The immigration system’s 
practice of deciding bond amounts without a detailed individualized analysis 
leads to bond determinations that are often unobtainable for immigrant detain-
ees, thus causing detention of immigrants whom an IJ found could be safely 
released.153 
                                                                                                                           
 148 See Legomsky, supra note 13, at 496–98 (discussing the authorization by the federal govern-
ment to have state authorities assist in immigration enforcement). 
 149 See id. at 500–01 (discussing public perception of non-legal immigrants as being similar to 
criminals). 
 150 See id. This is despite the fact that immigrants as a group commit less crimes per-capita than 
non-immigrants. Id. at 501. 
 151 Compare N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a) (listing financial situation as a factor to con-
sider when setting bail in New York), and WYO. RULES. CRIM. PROC. 46.1(d) (listing financial situa-
tion as a factor to consider when setting bail in Wyoming), with Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 791 (find-
ing that IJs should consider an immigrant’s threat to national security as well as threat to community 
safety when determining bond but not directing them to consider financial situation of the defendant), 
and Castillo-Cajura, 2009 WL 3063742, at *1 (finding that financial situation of a immigrant is not a 
relevant factor in determining bond amount), and Sandoval-Gomez, 2008 WL 5477710, at *1 (finding 
that an immigrant’s financial situation is not a relevant factor in the consideration of bond amount), 
and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (providing immigration detention procedures for bond redetermination with-
out requiring consideration of an immigrant’s financial situation). 
 152 See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 984 (discussing how the plaintiff was found to not be a flight 
risk or danger to her community, but remained detained because the IJ, without considering her finan-
cial situation, set a bond that was beyond her ability to pay); BYRNE ET AL., supra note 13, at 25–30 
(describing experiences of immigrants who were granted monetary bond but remained detained due to 
their inability to pay); INSECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 18 (noting that in New York, 55% of 
immigrants who are granted monetary bond are unable to pay it and thus remain detained); Michael K. 
T. Tan & Michael Kaufman, Jailing the Immigrant Poor: Hernandez v. Sessions, 21 CUNY L. REV. 
69, 74–76 (2017) (discussing the result of not requiring IJs to consider financial situation when deter-
mining bond). 
 153 See Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 793 (establishing factors that should be considered when deter-
mining bond); Castillo-Cajura, 2009 WL 3063742, at *1 (finding an immigrant’s financial status is 
irrelevant to a bond determination); Sandoval-Gomez, 2008 WL 5477710, at *1 (finding financial 
status should not be considered when determining bond); BYRNE ET AL., supra note 18, at 25–30 (dis-
cussing immigrants who were granted bond they could not afford); INSECURE COMMUNITIES, supra 
note 18 (noting that in New York, many immigrants remain detained despite being granted bond); Tan 
& Kaufman, supra note 152, at 88–89 (discussing how not considering immigrant’s financial situation 
often results in immigrants spending time in detention); Gilman, supra note 11, at 211–13 (discussing 
the often arbitrary nature of immigration bond determination). Stories of immigrants being detained 
due to their inability to pay bond are abundant. See BYRNE ET AL., supra note 18, at 25 (describing 
experiences of various immigrants from all over the world who were granted monetary bond but re-
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C. Authority for Applying Criminal Bail Procedures to Immigration Bond 
The Supreme Court has addressed the constitutional rights of immigrants 
several times.154 The Court has held that once in the United States, immigrants, 
regardless of their legal status, are afforded certain constitutional protec-
tions.155 These protections include the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.156 Additionally, the Supreme Court has found that the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments apply to all people residing within the borders of the United 
States and therefore apply to non-legal immigrants.157 Furthermore, a recent 
decision from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit could require IJs to 
consider an immigrant’s financial situation when determining a bond amount 
in order to comply with the requirements of the Constitution.158 
1. Immigration Bond Precedent: The Effect of the Zadvydas Decision 
The Supreme Court addressed the rights of detained immigrants exten-
sively in Zadvydas v. Davis.159 The Court held that indefinite detention was 
unconstitutional and if there was no reasonable possibility of deportation 
                                                                                                                           
mained detained due to their inability to pay). For example, Pilar, a transgender woman from Hondu-
ras was subjected to severe persecution and sexual abuse in her home country. Id. After receiving no 
help from Honduran authorities, Pilar fled to the United States. Id. She was detained at the border and 
placed in removal proceedings. Id. She was given the assistance of a lawyer for her bond hearing from 
a non-profit legal aid agency, but despite this the IJ set her bond at $12,000. Id. As Pilar was unable to 
afford this, she spent the next six months in detention until she was granted asylum. Id. 
 154 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 702 (finding indefinite detention of non-legal immigrants to be 
unconstitutional if there is no reasonable likelihood of removal); Plyler II, 457 U.S. at 210 (finding 
that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments apply to non-legal immigrants); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 
67, 77 (1976) (allowing Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protection to non-legal immigrants). 
 155 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693–94 (finding that the Due Process Clause applies to non-legal 
immigrants); Plyler II, 457 U.S. at 210 (finding that some constitutional protections apply to non-legal 
immigrants); Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77 (providing constitutional protections to non-legal immigrants). 
 156 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693–94 (providing Due Process Clause protection to non-legal 
immigrants); Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77 (finding that the Due Process Clause applies to non-legal im-
migrants). 
 157 See Verdugo Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271 (finding that the Fourth Amendment applies to all 
those living within the borders of the United States); Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77 (finding that the Fifth 
Amendment applies to non-legal immigrants). 
 158 See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 990–91 (finding that under the Fifth Amendment, IJs are likely 
required to consider an immigrant’s financial situation when determining a bond amount). 
 159 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693–94 (addressing the constitutional rights of non-legal immi-
grants). It is important to note that this case was decided three months before the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. See Margaret Taylor, Judicial Deference to 
Congressional Folly: The Story of Demore v. Kim, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343, 344–45 (David 
Martin & Peter Schuck eds., 2005) (discussing the historical context of the Demore decision). There is 
speculation that the events of September 11, 2001, changed the Court’s views on the constitutional 
rights of non-citizens. See id. There is some evidence of this in the Court’s decision in Demore v. Kim, 
where the Court held that indefinite detention of immigrants convicted of certain types of crimes was 
constitutional. See 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003); Taylor, supra (discussing the potential effect of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11 on the Supreme Court’s decision in Demore). 
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through the legal process known as removal, DHS was required to release a 
detained immigrant, regardless of his lack of legal status.160 The Court held 
that a non-legal immigrant’s liberty interest is not reduced in any way due to 
his lack of legal status.161 In reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged 
that the procedures used in criminal detention cases can act as helpful guides 
when analyzing the procedures used in immigration detention.162 Following 
this, the Court determined that detention should be limited to meeting two pur-
poses: ensuring an immigrant’s appearance in court and protecting people from 
any danger the immigrant might pose.163 The Court stated that in order to justi-
fy infringement on liberty, detention must be sufficiently tailored to reducing 
the danger posed by the detainee and preventing undue flight risk.164 
The holding in Zadyydas stands for the position that once in the United 
States, immigrants, regardless of their legal status, are afforded certain consti-
tutional protections.165 These protections include the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.166 Additionally, the Supreme Court has found that the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments apply to all people residing within the borders 
of the United States and therefore apply to non-legal immigrants.167 As a result 
                                                                                                                           
 160 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699 (concluding that detention is not permissible if removal is not 
reasonably possible). Removal is sometimes made impossible due to an immigrant’s home country 
refusing to allow the immigrant entry. See id. at 684. In order for removal to occur, the United States 
must find a country that is willing to accept the immigrant. See Carol Morello, Deporting Convicted 
Criminals from the U.S. Is Not as Easy as It Sounds, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/deporting-convicted-criminals-from-the-us-is-not-as-
easy-as-it-sounds/2016/11/27/b2d8759a-b1ac-11e6-be1c-8cec35b1ad25_story.html?utm_term=.
2f88382d1e31 [https://perma.cc/KL83-V5P6] (discussing the requirement of travel papers from an 
immigrant’s home country in order to deport that immigrant, and a group of countries who refuse to 
issue them). 
 161 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 704 (finding indefinite detention of non-legal immigrants to be 
unconstitutional if there is no reasonable likelihood of removal); Plyler II, 457 U.S. at 210 (finding 
that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments apply to non-legal immigrants); Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77 
(finding that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments apply to non-legal immigrants). 
 162 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–91 (using criminal bail procedures as a guide to determining a 
civil bond issue). This premise was later enforced by the Court in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127–
28 (1996). The Court held in M.L.B. that precedent and procedure for detaining individuals in criminal 
proceedings should not be limited to criminal defendants, but rather should include individuals in all 
proceedings that involve deprivation of liberty. See id. 
 163 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–91 (discussing the purpose of immigration bond). 
 164 See id. at 690 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)) (discussing the constitu-
tionality of immigration detention). 
 165 Id. at 693–94 (finding that the Due Process Clause applies to non-legal immigrants); see Plyler 
II, 457 U.S. at 210 (finding that some constitutional protections apply to non-legal immigrants); 
Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77 (providing constitutional protections to non-legal immigrants). 
 166 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693–94 (providing Due Process Clause protection to non-legal immi-
grants); see Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77 (finding that the Due Process Clause applies to non-legal immi-
grants). 
 167 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271 (granting Fourth Amendment protections to all those 
living within the borders of the United States); Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77 (finding that the Fifth 
Amendment applies to non-legal immigrants). 
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of Zadvydas, indefinite detention of immigrants is no longer permitted where 
there is no reasonable likelihood that the immigrant will be removed.168 The 
reasoning in Zadvydas has not extended to the determination of bond amount, 
however, as IJs are not required to consider an immigrant’s ability to pay when 
determining bond.169 
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Hernandez II 
Recently, a case in the Ninth Circuit has introduced the premise that an 
immigrant’s ability to pay should be taken into consideration when determin-
ing bond in immigration cases.170 In Hernandez v. Lynch (Hernandez I), a class 
of immigrants sued the federal government, arguing that bond determination 
procedures violated their constitutional rights.171 The plaintiffs claimed that the 
existing government procedures violated the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.172 
Finding that the plaintiffs had established a substantial likelihood of success, 
the District Court for the Central District of California granted a preliminary 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699 (finding that indefinite immigration detention is prohibited 
under the constitution). 
 169 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (providing statutory authority for immigration detention and immigra-
tion bond); Castillo-Cajura, 2009 WL 3063742, at *1 (finding that financial situation of an immigrant 
is not a relevant factor in determining bond amount); Sandoval-Gomez, 2008 WL 5477710, at *1 
(finding that an immigrant’s financial situation is not a relevant factor in the consideration of bond 
amount); Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 791 (finding that IJs should consider an immigrant’s threat to 
national security, community safety and flight risk when determining bond but not that they should 
consider financial ability); Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 666 (finding that bond should be granted so long 
as an immigrant does not pose a high safety risk or an undue flight risk but not that they should con-
sider financial ability of respondent); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h) (providing immigration bond procedures 
but not providing an opportunity for the IJ to consider the financial ability of the respondent); see also 
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (stating that immigration detention should be sufficiently related to serving 
its stated purpose). 
 170 See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 1000 (finding that it is likely unconstitutional to set immigration 
bond without considering an immigrant’s financial situation). 
 171 Hernandez v. Lynch (Hernandez I), Case No. 16-00620-JGB, 2016 WL 7116611, at *2 (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 10, 2016), aff’d, 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017). This case was the district court decision that 
was appealed to the Ninth Circuit in Hernandez II. See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 981; Hernandez I, 
2016 WL 7116611, at *1. The difference in the named defendant is due to the change in administra-
tion, and thus change in Attorney General, that occurred between 2016 and 2017. See Hernandez II, 
872 F.3d at 981; Eric Lichtblau & Matt Flegenheimer, Jeff Sessions Confirmed as Attorney General, 
Capping Bitter Battle, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/politics/jeff-
sessions-attorney-general-confirmation.html [https://perma.cc/3GSL-FCV5] (noting the confirmation 
of Jeff Sessions as the new Attorney General). On November 7, 2018, Jeff Sessions resigned as Attor-
ney General and was replaced by Matthew Whitaker, as such the case name of this litigation changed, 
and will change again as soon as an official nominee is confirmed. See Peter Baker et al., Jeff Sessions 
Forced Out as Attorney General as Trump Installs Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/sessions-resigns.html [https://perma.cc/V6DH-N2VU]. 
 172 See Hernandez I, 2016 WL 7116611, at *21. 
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injunction requiring IJs in the district to consider financial situation when set-
ting bond.173 The government appealed the injunction to the Ninth Circuit.174 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction, finding that the 
plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on their Fifth Amendment due 
process challenge.175 The court began its analysis by stating that any objectives 
accomplished by the government through detention must be of greater im-
portance then the constitutional interest of protecting an individual’s liberty.176 
The court added that there must be a reasonable connection between the effect 
of detention of immigrants and the purpose of that detention.177 The court not-
ed that in order for an immigrant to be granted bond, an IJ must first find that 
the particular immigrant is not dangerous and is likely to appear at required 
court hearings.178 The court then went a step further by concluding that consid-
eration of an immigrant’s financial situation is necessary to ensure that deten-
tion and bond are closely related enough to satisfy Fifth Amendment due pro-
cess requirements.179 
In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit cited precedent from both 
the Supreme Court and other federal appellate courts.180 A recurring principle 
                                                                                                                           
 173 See id. at *20. In granting this preliminary injunction the District Court for the Central District 
of California used a standard established by the Supreme Court. See id. (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)) (summarizing the standard for granting a preliminary in-
junction). In order to be granted a preliminary injunction a plaintiff must show that “he is likely to 
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 
that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” See Win-
ter, 555 U.S. at 20. 
 174 Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 981. 
 175 Id. at 1000. Although the Ninth Circuit noted that the district court additionally found that the 
plaintiffs had a substantial likelihood of success under their Eighth Amendment excessive bail chal-
lenge, the Ninth Circuit affirmed solely on the basis of the due process challenge and neglected to 
reach an opinion on the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment challenge. See id. at 990 n.16; Hernandez I, 
2016 WL 7116611, at *28 (finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their Eighth Amendment 
challenge). 
 176 Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 990. The interest furthered by detaining immigrants is ensuring that 
they appear at required court hearings and preventing any unreasonable danger they might cause if 
released. See id. 
 177 Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690) (stating “any detention incidental to removal must 
bear[] [a] reasonable relation to [its] purpose”). 
 178 Id. 
 179 See id. at 990–91, 1000. In support of its finding, the Ninth Circuit cited a statistic that showed 
that between 95% and 99% of immigrants released from detention through an alternative release pro-
gram (one without monetary bond such as conditional parole or ankle bracelet monitoring) attended 
all of their required hearings. See id. at 991. 
 180 See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 447–48 (2011) (finding that the prosecution must show 
that a defendant has the ability to pay child support before imprisoning him for failure to pay); 
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983) (finding it unconstitutional to revoke probation due to 
the failure of an individual to pay a court ordered fee without first considering the defendant’s finan-
cial situation); Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 991–92; Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 
1978) (finding that financial situation should be considered to ensure that bail is sufficiently tailored 
to its purpose). 
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from those cases declares that the government cannot be said to have adequate-
ly balanced the cause for detention (i.e. protection from dangerous respondents 
and negation of flight risk) with its effect (i.e. restriction of a respondent’s lib-
erty) if the government has not considered a respondent’s financial situation.181 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the government was unable to show a need to 
continue the detention of immigrants who have been granted bond but are una-
ble to afford it.182 Therefore, the court held that it is likely a violation of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to fail to consider an immigrant’s abil-
ity to pay when setting bond.183 
III. THE BENEFITS OF REQUIRING IMMIGRATION JUDGES TO CONSIDER AN 
IMMIGRANT’S FINANCIAL SITUATION WHEN DETERMINING BOND 
The decision of the Ninth Circuit in Hernandez II resulted in a substantial 
change to the bond redetermination procedures of immigration courts located 
within the Ninth Circuit.184 The court found that the plaintiffs in this case had a 
likelihood of success on their Fifth Amendment due process challenge, and 
upheld the preliminary injunction granted by the U. S. District Court for the 
Central District of California.185 The preliminary injunction requires ICE 
agents and IJs operating within the Central District of California to take into 
consideration an immigrant’s financial situation when setting bond.186 Addi-
tionally, the injunction restricts them from setting bond higher than what is 
                                                                                                                           
 181 See Turner, 564 U.S. at 447–48 (considering detention for a respondent who was unable to 
pay child support due to lack of funds); Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672 (considering detention for a re-
spondent who was unable to pay court imposed fine due to a lack of funds); Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 
991–92 (considering detention for immigrants who are unable to pay bond due to a lack of funds); 
Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1057 (considering detention for indigent criminal defendants). The court dismissed 
the argument that cases dealing with criminal detention should not be applied in the civil detention 
setting, noting that the Supreme Court in Zadvydas used criminal bail procedure as guidance. See 
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–91 (noting that criminal law can be used as guidance for immigration law); 
Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 993; see also M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 127–28 (finding that criminal bail proce-
dures are an appropriate guide in situations involving depravation of liberty). 
 182 See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 994 (considering the government’s purpose for immigration 
detention). 
 183 See id. at 1000. The result of Hernandez II was a continuation of the preliminary injunction 
issued in Hernandez I, and a trial on the merits is still forthcoming. See id. A decision was released as 
recently as January 3, 2018, and involved attorney’s fees for a motion to compel drafted by the plain-
tiffs (the motion to compel, as well as the motion for attorney’s fees, were granted). See Hernandez v. 
Sessions, Case No. EDCV 16–620–JGB, 2018 WL 276687, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2018). This is the 
most current update available at the time of this Note’s publication. 
 184 See Hernandez v. Sessions (Hernandez II), 872 F.3d 976, 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding 
that determining immigration bond without considering an immigrant’s financial situation likely vio-
lates that immigrant’s constitutional rights). 
 185 Id. at 1000; Hernandez v. Lynch (Hernandez I), Case No. 16-00620-JGB, 2016 WL 7116611, 
at *20 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2016), aff’d, 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 186 Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 987; Hernandez I, 2016 WL 7116611, at *20. 
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reasonably required to compel the immigrant’s appearance at hearings.187 Fi-
nally, it requires them to consider alternative conditions to release, such as an-
kle bracelet monitoring, and if possible, grant those conditions instead of mon-
etary bond.188 Because the case is still ongoing in the district court, the fate of 
this injunction is unclear, both in terms of whether it will become a permanent 
injunction and whether its policy will be expanded beyond the Ninth Circuit.189 
The decision of the Ninth Circuit to affirm the preliminary injunction is 
sound both in terms of law and policy.190 Section A of this part discusses why 
the legal reasoning in Hernandez II is likely to be upheld by the district court 
and on future appeals (to either other circuits or the BIA) and why it is con-
sistent with the historical understanding of the purpose of bond.191 Section B 
explores the policy implications of this injunction and argue that it is in the 
best interest of the DHS and Department of Justice (DOJ) to change their regu-
lations to match the requirements of the preliminary injunction.192 
A. Yes, Immigrants Have Fifth Amendment Rights: The Merit of Hernandez II 
It is worth examining if the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Hernandez II is 
consistent with precedent regarding constitutional protections for non-legal 
immigrants.193 In affirming the preliminary injunction issued by the District 
                                                                                                                           
 187 Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 987; Hernandez I, 2016 WL 7116611, at *20. 
 188 Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 987; Hernandez I, 2016 WL 7116611, at *20. The preliminary in-
junction also requires all members of the certified class to be given a new bond redetermination hear-
ing within forty-five days of the decision. See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 987; Hernandez I, 2016 WL 
7116611, at *20. 
 189 See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 1000. The decision of the Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary 
injunction granted by the district court. See id. The case is still being litigated at the district court 
level, and a decision in favor of the government would result in the removal of the preliminary injunc-
tion. See id. (upholding the district court’s preliminary injunction); Preliminary Injunction, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “preliminary injunction” as “[a] temporary injunction 
issued before or during trial to prevent an irreparable injury from occurring before the court has a 
chance to decide the case”). 
 190 See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 1000 (holding that the plaintiffs had a substantial possibility of 
success on their Fifth Amendment claims); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) 
(finding that bond amount must be tailored to meet its purpose of ensuring an immigrant’s appearance 
at hearings); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (finding that Fifth Amendment 
rights apply to non-legal immigrants); Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (find-
ing that the due process and equal protection requirements of the Fifth Amendment requires individu-
alized bail hearings that consider a defendant’s financial situation); Tan & Kaufman, supra note 152, 
at 88–89 (noting the positive impact which Hernandez II will have on immigration detention policy). 
 191 See infra notes 193–206 and accompanying text. 
 192 See infra notes 207–224 and accompanying text. 
 193 Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 1000; see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (finding that bond must be 
reasonably tailored to meet the stated goals of the government); Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238 (holding 
that Fifth Amendment rights apply to non-legal immigrants); Tan & Kaufman, supra note 152, at 79–
82 (discussing constitutional protections of immigrants and how they pertain to immigration deten-
tion). 
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Court, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their 
Fifth Amendment challenge.194 By setting bond without considering an immi-
grant’s financial situation, the government likely violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.195 Fifth Amendment rights, and specifically 
protection under the Due Process Clause, have long been found to apply to 
non-legal immigrants.196 As this decision only applies to the Ninth Circuit, 
other courts will still have to deal with the question of whether the Due Pro-
cess Clause protects non-legal immigrants from bond determinations that do 
not consider financial situation.197 
This decision is consistent with the understanding of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment within the immigration context.198 It has been 
established that the Fifth Amendment requires that the act of detention be suf-
ficiently tailored to meet the stated purpose of the government.199 In order to 
receive release on bond, it must be determined that a particular immigrant does 
not pose a danger to national security or to their community.200 Therefore, the 
purpose of bond itself must be to reduce an immigrant’s risk of flight and to 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 1000. 
 195 See id. at 990, 1000; Hernandez I, 2016 WL 7116611, at *20, *27 (summarizing the prelimi-
nary injunction sought by plaintiffs and determining that plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of 
success on their Fifth Amendment challenge). 
 196 See Plyler v. Doe (Plyler II), 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (allowing Fifth Amendment protec-
tions to apply to non-legal immigrants); Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238 (providing that Fifth Amend-
ment rights to non-legal immigrants); Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 990, 1000 (finding that plaintiffs had 
a substantial likelihood of success on their Fifth Amendment due process claim). 
 197 See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 990, 1000 (granting a preliminary injunction); ACLU, PRAC-
TICE ADVISORY, BOND HEARINGS AND ABILITY-TO-PAY DETERMINATIONS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
UNDER HERNANDEZ V. SESSIONS 1 (2017) (noting that Hernandez II is the first decision of its kind and 
that although it will only apply in the Ninth Circuit, other courts will likely use it as persuasive author-
ity); Preliminary Injunction, supra note 189.  
 198 Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 990; see Zadvydas 533 U.S. at 690 (finding that bond must be rea-
sonably tailored to meet the stated goals of the government); Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238 (finding 
that Fifth Amendment rights apply to non-legal immigrants). If the Fifth Amendment applies to non-
legal immigrants, and in order to comply with the Fifth Amendment detention must be tailored to 
meet government goals, it follows that if the government is going to grant bond it must be tailored to 
an immigrant’s ability to pay. See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 990. 
 199 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)) (holding 
that immigration detention with the end purpose of removal must reasonably relate to its purpose); 
Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 990; Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 950 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690) (“[D]ue process requires ‘adequate procedural protec-
tions’ to ensure that the government’s asserted justification for physical confinement ‘outweighs the 
individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.’”). 
 200 See In re Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. 791, 793 (B.I.A. 2016) (holding that IJs should consider an 
immigrant’s threat to national security, threat to community safety, as well as risk of flight when de-
termining bond); In re Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666, 666 (B.I.A. 1976) (holding that bond should be 
granted so long as an immigrant does not pose a high safety risk or an undue flight risk); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.19 (2018) (providing that in determining immigration bond, an IJ should consider an immi-
grant’s flight risk and threat of danger). 
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incentivize appearances at hearings.201 Many criminal law cases support the 
premise that in order for a bond to properly incentivize court appearances, it 
must be geared toward an individual’s unique financial situation.202 
As immigration procedure stood before Hernandez II, DHS agents and IJs 
set bond without consideration of a respondent’s financial situation.203 This 
ensured that bond did not represent a reasonable incentive for court appearance 
for many individuals who were unable to afford the amount set.204 Immigration 
detention represents a situation where restriction of liberty is being used not to 
achieve some legitimate government purpose, but rather as an unnecessary 
                                                                                                                           
 201 See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 990–91; Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 793 (holding that IJs should 
consider an immigrant’s threat to national security, threat to community safety as well as danger of 
flight risk when determining bond); Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 666 (holding that bond should be granted 
so long as an immigrant does not pose a high safety risk or an undue flight risk); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 
(providing that IJs should consider an immigrant’s risk of flight and risk of danger when determining 
bond amount). 
 202 See Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1057 (holding that a defendant’s financial situation must be considered 
when determining bail); Beddow v. State, 68 So. 2d 503, 504 (Ala. 1953) (holding that a defendant’s 
“station in life” must be considered when determining bail); Camera v. State, 916 So. 2d 946, 947 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (remanding the case to consider a defendant’s financial situation for the 
purposes of bail); Brangan v. Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949, 959 (Mass. 2017) (finding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that a judge consider a defendant’s financial situation when deter-
mining bail). Justice Geraldine Hines of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts summarized 
this problem well in her decision in Brangan. See 80 N.E.3d at 959. Justice Hines stated, “[a] bail that 
is set without any regard to whether a defendant is a pauper or a plutocrat runs the risk of being exces-
sive and unfair.” Id. The decision went on, “[a] $250 cash bail will have little impact on the well-to-
do, for whom it is less than the cost of a night’s stay in a downtown Boston hotel, but it will probably 
result in detention for a homeless person whose entire earthly belongings can be carried in a cart.” Id. 
 203 See Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 793 (finding that IJs should consider an immigrant’s threat to 
national security, community safety, as well as flight risk when determining bond, but not directing 
any inquiry into the financial situation of the immigrant); In re Castillo-Cajura, No. A089 853 733, 
2009 WL 3063742, at *1 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 2009) (finding that financial situation of an immigrant is 
not a relevant factor in determining bond amount); In re Sandoval-Gomez, No. AXXX XX3 965, 
2008 WL 5477710, at *1 (B.I.A. Dec. 15, 2008) (finding that an immigrant’s financial situation is not 
a relevant factor in the consideration of bond amount); Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 666 (finding that bond 
should be granted so long as an immigrant does not pose a high safety risk or an undue flight risk, but 
not directing any inquiry into the financial situation of the immigrant); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (providing 
immigration bond procedures for redetermination hearings without allowing for consideration of an 
immigrant’s financial situation). 
 204 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (finding that detention should be tailored to the government’s 
purpose which is ensuring an immigrant’s appearance at hearings); BYRNE & ACER, supra note 127, 
at 204 (describing experiences of immigrants who were granted monetary bond but remained detained 
due to their inability to pay); INSECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 18, at 11 (noting that in New York, 
55% of immigrants who are granted monetary bond are unable to pay it and thus remain detained). 
Chinua, from Nigeria, can provide another example of an immigrant who was granted bond, but re-
mained detained due to his inability to pay. BYRNE ET AL., supra note 18, at 26. After Boko Haram 
killed his wife and one of his children, Chinua fled to the United States. See id. ICE set an initial bond 
of $7,500 which Chinua was unable to afford and as a result he remained detained for six months 
while awaiting his day in court. See id. 
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infringement on constitutionally protected liberty.205 The Ninth Circuit’s opin-
ion followed this reasoning in finding that detaining immigrants simply be-
cause they could not pay bond did not meet any government purpose and thus 
is likely unconstitutional.206 
B. Why the Holding of Hernandez II Is Good for the Federal  
Government (Looking at You DHS) 
The policy change enacted by the preliminary injunction issued in Her-
nandez II should be adopted as a regulation by DHS and the DOJ, as the result-
ing effects for the government (and taxpayers) would be largely positive.207 
Rather than continuing to challenge this procedural change, the government 
should accept it and use the money it would save for more effective forms of 
immigration enforcement.208 
The amount of money the federal government spends on the detention of 
immigrants (legal and non-legal) is approximately $2 billion per year, and that 
number is expected to grow as the new administration aggressively expands 
                                                                                                                           
 205 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (finding that bond must be reasonably tailored to meet the 
stated goals of the government which is ensuring an immigrant appears at hearings, and is not danger-
ous); Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 990 (finding that under the Fifth Amendment, immigration detention 
must be tailored so that it meets the government’s purpose without unnecessarily infringing upon the 
liberty of immigrants); Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 950 (finding that detention must balance the 
government’s interest in ensuring an immigrants appearance, with the immigrant’s interest in liberty); 
Tan & Kaufman, supra note 152, at 75–76 (noting how immigrants are routinely detained not because 
they are dangerous or pose a flight risk, but because they cannot afford the bond which is set for 
them). 
 206 See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 992, 1000. Although the Ninth Circuit did not address the plain-
tiff’s Eighth Amendment claims, the district court did, and in granting the plaintiffs’ preliminary in-
junction, found that they were likely to prevail. See id. at 990 n.16; Hernandez I, 2016 WL 7116611, 
at *20. As there is very little judicial discussion on this issue, it will be interesting to see if it will be 
discussed in further cases, or if courts will continue to base the decisions solely on the Fifth Amend-
ment argument as the Ninth Circuit did. See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 990 n.16. 
 207 See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 987 (discussing the scope of the preliminary injunction); 
Marouf, supra note 126, at 2160–70 (noting alternative forms of release for immigrants and noting 
their cost compared to detention as well as their rate of success); NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE 
MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION: RUNAWAY COSTS FOR IMMIGRATION DETENTION DO NOT ADD 
UP TO SENSIBLE POLICIES 2 (2013), http://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Math-
of-Immigation-Detention-August-2013-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XP6-V2KE] (noting the 
amount of money which the government spends on immigration detention); ACLU, supra note 197 
(noting alternatives to detention some of which cost only 17 cents a day per immigrant compared to 
up to $298 a day for detention). 
 208 See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 987 (discussing the scope of the preliminary injunction as re-
quiring IJs to consider an immigrant’s ability to pay bond as well as alternatives monetary bond when 
deciding release conditions); Marouf, supra note 126, at 2160–70 (noting alternative forms of release 
for immigrants and noting their cost compared to detention); Gilman, supra note 11, at 198–202 (not-
ing the success of alternatives to detention in the criminal system); ACLU, supra note 197 (noting 
alternatives to detention some of which cost only 17 cents a day per immigrant compared to up to 
$298 a day for detention and calling on DHS to change their detention policies). 
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the scope of its immigration enforcement activities.209 This means that $150–
$300 is spent per immigrant per day.210 If immigration control is to remain a 
priority for the current administration (and presumably Congress), funding 
may be devoted not just to increase ICE operations, but to increase border pa-
trol and potentially construct a physical barrier on the border.211 Assuming tax-
es are not raised, the funding for this increased immigration and border control 
will have to come from cuts or repurposing of funds elsewhere in the govern-
ment.212 If fewer immigrants were detained, the federal government, and spe-
cifically DHS, stands to save a significant amount of money.213 
                                                                                                                           
 209 See NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 207, at 2 (detailing the funds spent by the feder-
al government on immigration detention); see also John Burnett, Big Money as Private Immigrant 
Jails Boom, NPR (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/21/565318778/big-money-as-private-
immigrant-jails-boom [https://perma.cc/DD5K-5MB7] (discussing the large amount of money spent 
on immigration detention); Wamsley, supra note 9 (discussing the increased budget request for ICE as 
the new administration looks to make more immigration arrests). 
 210 See NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 209, at 2 (noting that DHS spent around $159 a 
day per immigrant in 2014 and $164 a day per immigrant in 2012); see also ACLU, ALTERNATIVES 
TO IMMIGRATION DETENTION: LESS COSTLY AND MORE HUMANE THAN FEDERAL LOCKUP, https://
www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/aclu_atd_fact_sheet_final_v.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG8Q-
M8FN] (noting amounts spent by various different detention facilities which were as much as $298 
per immigrant per day). 
 211 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR AMERICAN GREATNESS 18 (2018) (requesting increases in 
funding for several immigration related initiatives); Pete Grieve, Trump Tweets ‘We Will BUILD THE 
WALL!,’ CNN POLITICS (June 22, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/22/politics/donald-trump-
build-wall-mexico-second-deadliest/index.html [https://perma.cc/XT5R-XWNC] (discussing a plan to 
build a physical barrier on the border with Mexico); Ron Nixon & Linda Qiu, Trump’s Evolving 
Words on the Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/us/politics/
trump-border-wall-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/4FZX-MQZA] (discussing changes in the plan 
to build a wall on the border with Mexico). The issue of funding for a border wall came to a head in 
December 2018, with President Trump refusing to allow any budget which did not provide $5.7 bil-
lion for a barrier. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Emily Cochrane, Demanding Wall Funding, Trump 
Balks at Bill to Avert Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/
us/politics/trump-government-shutdown.html [https://perma.cc/N9YD-AWQY] (summarizing events 
culminating in a partial shutdown of the federal government). This argument resulted in the longest 
federal government shutdown in history, with Democrats refusing to cede to the President’s funding 
demands. See Abigail Abrams, This Is Now the Longest Government Shutdown in U.S. History, TIME 
(Jan. 12, 2019), http://time.com/5499397/shutdown-longest-history/ [https://perma.cc/CHK9-DQB5] 
(discussing the 2018–2019 partial shutdown of the federal government). 
 212 See Hamad Aleaziz, ‘Collateral’ Immigration Arrests Threaten Key Crime Alliances, S.F. 
CHRON. (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Collateral-immigration-arrests-
threaten-key-11106426.php [https://perma.cc/N3CX-F5JX] (noting that to meet the demands of its 
increased deportation priorities, DHS has directed its investigations division, which normally focuses 
on cross border crime, to devote more time to immigration control); Alan Gomez, Trump Budget 
Wants Billions More for Border Wall, Immigration Agents and Judges, USA TODAY (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/02/12/trump-budget-wants-billions-more-border-
wall-immigration-agents-and-judges/329766002/ [https://perma.cc/D4PT-KNME] (noting the com-
mitment by the Trump administration to increase border security); see also Eileen Sullivan & Michael 
Tackett, In Signing Sweeping Tax Bill, Trump Questions Whether He Is Getting Enough Credit, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/22/us/politics/trump-tax-bill.html [https://
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This is not to say that detention serves no role in immigration control.214 
If an immigrant bears a significant threat to their community, to national secu-
rity, or poses an unreasonably high flight risk, it is likely in the best interest of 
the public that they remain detained while awaiting their immigration hearing 
and final deportation.215 This is not the case, however, for immigrants who are 
granted bond.216 As discussed above, the only way in which a DHS agent, or 
an IJ may legally grant an immigrant bond is if the immigrant is able to prove 
first that they are not statutorily barred due to committing certain crimes and 
then that they: (1) are not a threat to the national security; (2) do not pose a 
threat to their community; and (3) are not an unreasonable flight risk.217 Many 
immigrants, however, who are granted bond remain detained (at a cost of 
$150–$300 a day) simply because they are unable to pay the bond set.218 The 
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/2A87-LJXK] (discussing the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which was signed into law by Presi-
dent Trump and lowered taxes). On February 15, 2019, President Trump declared a national emergen-
cy and sought to divert funds from the Department of Defense to begin construction of a wall on the 
southern border. Presidential Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019). 
 213 See NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 209, at 2 (noting that DHS spent around $159 a 
day per immigrant in 2014 and $164 a day per immigrant in 2012); ACLU, supra note 197 (noting 
amounts spent by various different detention facilities which were as much as $298 per immigrant per 
day). 
 214 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (noting the purpose of immigration bond as being a means to 
ensure immigrants appear at hearings); Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 792, 795 (finding that an immigrant 
who held a fake passport which was found to be created by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, a ter-
rorist organization, posed a danger to national security and thus should not be granted bond); Patel, 15 
I. & N. Dec. at 666 (finding that bond should be granted so long as an immigrant does not pose a high 
safety risk or an undue flight risk). 
 215 See Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 795 (finding that an IJ was correct in denying bond to an immi-
grant who was found to pose a threat to national security); In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 41 (B.I.A. 
2006) (finding that an IJ was correct in determining that an immigrant involved in a drug trafficking 
business posed a threat to the community and thus should not be released on bond); Patel, 15 I. & N. 
Dec. at 666 (finding that bond should be granted so long as an immigrant does not pose a high safety 
risk or an undue flight risk). 
 216 See Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 667 (finding that an immigrant who had never been arrested and 
presented little risk of flight should be released from detention); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (providing that 
immigrants should be granted bond so long as they do not pose a threat to the community or an unrea-
sonable flight risk). 
 217 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (2018) (providing crimes that make an immigrant inadmissible), 1226(c) 
(providing that immigrants who have committed certain crimes should be automatically detained), 
1227(a)(2) (providing crimes that make an immigrant deportable); Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 793 
(finding that IJs should consider an immigrant’s threat to national security, threat to community safety 
and flight risk when determining bond); Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 666 (finding that bond should be 
granted so long as an immigrant does not pose a high safety risk or an undue flight risk); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.19(h) (providing that an immigrant needs to show “that release would not pose a danger to 
other persons or to property [and] that the alien is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding or 
interview). 
 218 See Gilman, supra note 11, at 201–02 (discussing the negative effects of prolonged detention 
on an immigrant’s chances of a positive legal result); see also ACLU, supra note 197 (noting amounts 
spent by various different detention facilities which were as much as $298 per immigrant per day); 
BYRNE ET AL., supra note 18, at 25–30 (describing experiences of immigrants who were granted mon-
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preliminary injunction issued by the District Court for the District of Central 
California, and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, should be implemented nation-
wide, as it would save the DHS significant amounts of money.219 
It is true that a main purpose of bond in the immigration context is to en-
courage the appearance of immigrants at hearings.220 It has, however, been 
shown in both the immigration and criminal context that there are other meth-
ods of ensuring appearances that are just as, if not more, effective.221 These 
methods also cost significantly less money than detention.222 If the true pur-
pose of immigration arrest is indeed removal, then it should not matter to the 
government whether the immigrant spends his time in detention or at home 
with family.223 Additionally, if the immigrant manages to win his case and re-
main in the country, then removing detention from the scenario eliminates an 
unnecessary burden on liberty for an individual with a legal claim to stay in the 
country.224 
                                                                                                                           
etary bond but remained detained due to their inability to pay); NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra 
note 209, at 2 (noting that DHS spent around $159 a day per immigrant in 2014 and $164 a day per 
immigrant in 2012); INSECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 18 (noting that in New York, 55% of im-
migrants who are granted monetary bond are unable to pay it and thus remain detained). 
 219 See Hernandez II, 872 F.3d at 1000; Hernandez I, 2016 WL 7116611, at *20; NAT’L IMMI-
GRATION FORUM, supra note 209, at 2 (detailing the large amount of taxpayer money spent on immi-
gration detention); ACLU, supra note 197 (noting alternatives to detention some of which cost only 
17 cents a day per immigrant). 
 220 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (noting that a main purpose of immigration detention is ensur-
ing that an immigrant appears in court); Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 793 (finding that IJs should consid-
er an immigrant’s risk of flight); Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 666 (finding that bond should be granted so 
long as an immigrant does not pose an undue flight risk). 
 221 See Gilman, supra note 11, at 199–202 (describing alternative methods to monetary bond, 
specifically mentioning the pretrial agency of D.C.); Marouf, supra note 126, at 2155–70 (discussing 
alternatives to bond which include supervised release, electronic monitoring, and personal recogni-
zance); Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia, supra note 125 (detailing pretrial ser-
vices available for criminal defendants in Washington D.C. which include drug treatment and have 
reduced crime and flight rates among pre-trial defendants who are released from custody). 
 222 See Marouf, supra note 126, at 2160–70 (noting alternative forms of release for immigrants 
and noting their cost compared to detention); NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 209, at 2 (not-
ing the amount of money which the government spends on immigration detention); ACLU, supra note 
197 (noting alternatives to detention some of which cost only 17 cents a day per immigrant compared 
to up to $298 a day for detention). 
 223 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (noting that a main purpose of immigration detention is ensur-
ing that an immigrant appears in court, and preventing any danger the immigrant might pose); Her-
nandez II, 872 F.3d at 990–92 (discussing lack of reasons why the government needed to detain im-
migrants who cannot afford bond); Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 666 (finding that immigrants should be 
granted pre-hearing release so long as they can show they do not pose a danger to national security or 
a flight risk); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h) (providing that as long as an immigrant is not statutorily barred 
from release, they should be granted pre-hearing release if they can show that they are not a danger or 
a flight risk). 
 224 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (noting the strength of immigrants’ interest in liberty); Stack v. 
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (discussing the strong constitutional interest in liberty). See generally 
BYRNE ET AL., supra note 18 (describing experiences of immigrants who were granted monetary bond 
but remained detained due to their inability to pay). Nina, from Honduras provides one final example 
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CONCLUSION 
In Hernandez II, the Ninth Circuit found that the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause ensured that immigrants should have their financial situation 
taken into account when bond is set. This represents a significant change in 
immigration procedure. If upheld, and expanded beyond the Ninth Circuit, it 
would result in a significant decrease of detained immigrants. It would also 
result in a large reduction in government expenditures on immigration deten-
tion. Hernandez II was a legally sound decision because the Fifth Amendment 
undisputedly applies to non-legal immigrants, and the purpose of detention is 
not aided by detaining immigrants who cannot afford bond. The resulting poli-
cy change is also sound as it would allow more funding for more effective im-
migration control, while reducing unnecessary restrictions on liberty. 
JEREMY PEPPER 
                                                                                                                           
of an immigrant who remained detained due to a lack of funds despite proving to an IJ that she wasn’t 
a flight risk or a danger to others. See id. at 28. At age 18, Nina was raped, and when the Honduran 
police refused to help her despite continued threats from her rapist, she fled to the United States. See 
id. Finding she was not a flight risk, or a danger to others, an IJ granted her bond set at $7,500. See id. 
As Nina could not afford this she was detained for eight months awaiting her hearing. See id. 
